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Deregulation has played both the hero and the villain in recent years. This Article
evaluates the impact of deregulation on what may be the single most economically
important regulatory regime: the income tax. In order to accomplish this goal, it
applies the concepts of fiscal arbitrage and compliance spirals to three deregulatory
tax reforms. Compliance spirals describe an enforcement dynamic in which the reg-
ulator encourages compliance through a system of rewards for cooperation and
punishment for noncooperation. Fiscal arbitrage describes policy measures that
exploit cognitive biases and other anomalies to deliver political benefits by using
minimal political capital. The combination of these two concepts creates a tool for
tax authorities to evaluate deregulatory tax provisions for likely costs and benefits.
On balance, this Article finds that tax deregulation is likely to be harmful.
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INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis has breathed new life into debates about the
value of deregulation.1 Some commentators have blamed the transfor-
mation of a rigid command-and-control financial regulatory regime
into one that grants private actors broad discretion for the credit dis-
I The crisis has prompted greater skepticism of deregulation even among longtime
advocates like Richard Posner. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM
xii (2009) [hereinafter POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM] ("We are learning from [the
depression] that we need a more active and intelligent government to keep our model of
capitalist economy from running off the rails. The movement to deregulate the financial
industry went too far by exaggerating the resilience-the self-healing powers-of laissez-
faire capitalism."), with Richard A. Posner, A Financier Comments on A Failure of
Capitalism, ATLANTIC (June 17, 2009, 12:36 AM), http://correspondents.theatlantic.com/
richard-posner/2009/06/a-financier-comments on a failure-of_capitalism-thebook.php
("[O]ne important theme that failed to get appropriate consideration in [Posner's] book ...
is that markets are adaptive, as market players work hard to understand and integrate
recent events into their business strategies, whereas governments have much more diffi-
culty adjusting their approaches to changing conditions." (quoting E-mail from Lawrence
Hillibrand to Richard A. Posner (May 22, 2009)). Growing doubt about the wisdom of
deregulation is evinced by shifting attitudes toward the deregulation of the banking
industry, including the elimination of the Depression-era Glass-Steagall banking restric-
tions. Compare William M. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without
Glass-Steagall, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 281, 296 (1988) ("As a matter of sound regulatory
philosophy, Congress should allow the banking industry to respond to the natural competi-
tive forces that are shaping the markets unencumbered by regulatory constraints ....
Glass-Steagall threatens the long-term health and survival of banks as the fulcrum of our
financial system."), with POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra, at 326 ("[T]he econo-
mists who pushed deregulation . . . were not macroeconomists sensitive to the role of
banking regulation in preventing risk-taking that could bring on a depression .... ).
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ruptions at the root of the financial crisis.2 Tax deregulation produces
a similar shift toward private autonomy at the expense of public con-
trol.3 This Article first defines tax deregulation and then examines the
profound-and, until now, wholly unexamined-influence that der-
egulation has had on the U.S. tax regime. At the most basic level, tax
deregulation undermines sources of fiscal constraint and decreases
public revenues at a time when deficits loom large and spending shows
no signs of waning.
Over the past few decades, policymakers have replaced a pre-
sumption in favor of prescriptions and prohibitions with a preference
for private choice. 4 Although deregulation is often associated with the
airline and banking industries, few regulatory regimes have remained
unchanged. Indeed, the same impulse that resulted in the dismantling
of the Civil Aeronautics Board has transformed the way in which
2 Posner and others place significant blame for the current financial crisis on the mis-
guided deregulation of the financial system. See POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM,
supra note 1, at 317-18 ("The deregulation movement that began in the 1970s was aimed at
the regulated industries in general, and encompassed banking only because it was highly
regulated. The economists and eventually the politicians who pressed for deregulation
were not sensitive to the fact that deregulating banking has a macroeconomic significance
that deregulating railroads or trucking or airlines or telecommunications or oil pipelines
does not."); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 711 (2009) ("Not only is deregulation no longer
the presumptive policy prescription, the sense is growing that deregulation may have deep-
ened the current crisis .... Unless constrained by prudential financial regulation, market
forces appear to push financial institutions towards excessive use of leverage and inade-
quate diversification.").
3 At the risk of overextending the analogy, it is worth noting that links have been
drawn between the financial crisis and the long-running fiscal crisis. See, e.g., Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000) (discussing international tax competition's role in reducing
state revenue capabilities). Leaders of the so-called Group of 20 (G20) saw connections
between the financial crisis and the fiscal crisis. At their April 2009 summit in London, the
G20 announced that, as part of their response to the financial crisis, they "st[ood] ready to
deploy sanctions to protect our public finances and financial systems." G20, THE GLOBAL
PLAN FOR RECOVERY AND REFORM 15 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/
Documents/final-communique.pdf. But cf Allison Christians, Taxation in a Time of Crisis:
Policy Leadership from the OECD to the G20, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 20, 39-40 (2010)
(arguing that G20 lacks institutional capacity to influence tax policy to prevent financial
crises).
4 The check-the-box regulations offer an excellent illustration of this phenomenon.
Under prior law, taxpayers were forced to comply with a burdensome four-factor test
which classified entities according to their legal characteristics. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(a) (1961) (repealed 1997) (describing six criteria-of which four were deemed most
salient-that identified de facto corporations for tax purposes). Under current law, tax-
payers are explicitly invited to choose their classification. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a)
(2010) (providing that eligible entities can elect to be classified as corporations or
partnerships).
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authorities combat pollution. 5 The tax laws have not been immune
from this broad deregulatory dynamic.
Under the misleading banner of simplification, the deregulation
of the tax laws has offered taxpayers greater freedom to manage the
tax consequences of their activities. At the same time, it has provided
policymakers with opportunities to exploit cognitive biases and flaws
in the budgetary and legislative processes. That exploitation is pos-
sible even when the rationales for promoting taxpayer autonomy do
not withstand the gentlest scrutiny. Unfortunately, our experience
with tax deregulation has proven costly. This Article calls for a recon-
sideration of the deregulatory bias in our tax policymaking process.
The check-the-box entity classification regulations provide the
clearest illustration of the appeal and the hazards of tax deregulation.6
These regulations offer taxpayers freedom to choose or change a
classification (and therefore tax treatment) by merely checking a box
on a tax form.7 While quite different from the changes that deregu-
lated the airline industry, this change represented a transformation
that fits seamlessly into the effort to substitute private for public deci-
sion making.8
5 The term "environmental deregulation" is sometimes used to describe this phenom-
enon as applied to pollution standards. See, e.g., David W. Case, The EPA's Environmental
Stewardship Initiative: Attempting To Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda,
50 EMORY L.J. 1, 32 (2001) ("The public and political backlash that eventually derailed the
Reagan administration's environmental deregulation strategies served to greatly curtail
such procedural efforts as well."); Howard A. Latin, Environmental Deregulation and
Consumer Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 189 (1982)
("The cumulative effect of many deregulation initiatives will be to assign the principal
responsibility for environmental decisionmaking to the private market system."); Philip
Weinberg, Masquerade for Privilege: Deregulation Undermining Environmental Protection,
45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1321, 1321 (1988) ("Deregulation of the environment became a
dominant theme in the campaign of Ronald Reagan, and as President he reversed the
machinery his predecessors, and preceding Congresses, had built.").
6 The check-the-box regulations were part of a broad effort, prompted in part by the
Contract with America, to reduce the burden of governmental regulation on private actors.
See NYSBA Tax Section Strongly Endorses Check-the-Box Entity Classification Proposal,
95 TAX NOTES TODAY (Aug. 31, 1995), 95 TNT 173-64 (reprinting N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N,
REPORT ON THE "CHECK THE Box" ENTITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM PROPOSED IN
NOTICE 95-14 (1995)) ("[T]he current entity classification system imposes substantial com-
pliance costs on taxpayers, both in terms of the resources required to address entity classi-
fication issues and the effect of the uncertainties in the law."). See generally Steven A.
Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Election, and the Future
of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405 (2005) (describing how desire for tax sim-
plification motivated push for check-the-box regulations).
7 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) (specifying election requirements). The form on
which the election is made merely requires taxpayers to provide information about the
entity, such as the date of its formation and the identity of its owners. I.R.S. Form 8832
(2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf.
8 Given the breadth of the phenomenon, it is not surprising that deregulation would
assume a variety of forms. Then-Professor Stephen Breyer, for example, distinguished
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Of course, presented with Yogi Berra's proverbial fork in the
road, taxpayers took it. Granting taxpayers greater autonomy blunts
the capacity of the tax law to raise revenue and lessens its power to
influence private behavior. The tax law generally attempts to link tax
treatment to the economic substance of a transaction, and tax elec-
tions upset that relationship by allowing taxpayers to opt for the most
advantageous treatment, regardless of economic substance. 9 As a
result, the structures and transactions made possible by the deregu-
latory check-the-box rules have produced sweeping systemic disrup-
tion. Indeed, these changes arguably eclipse the alphabet soup of
credit default swaps (CDSs) and collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) unleashed by financial deregulation. 10 As taxpayers
embraced their newfound capacity to choose and change the classifi-
cation of entities-particularly in the international context-long-
standing tax rules that took a strict entity classification regime for
granted became paper tigers.11
This Article provides policymakers-and, perhaps more import-
antly, their watchdogs-with a framework for evaluating deregulatory
tax reforms. It does so by examining the role tax deregulation has
played in three decades of business tax reform. This Article further
argues that tax deregulation is generally undesirable-even in
instances where its impact is less dramatic-by examining tax deregu-
lation through the lenses of responsive regulation and fiscal arbitrage.
Responsive regulation suggests that empowering taxpayers to
self-regulate may enhance taxpayer cooperation by promoting posi-
between "generic" and "case-by-case" deregulation. Stephen Breyer, Reforming
Regulation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 4, 6 (1984) (advocating greater emphasis on latter type of
reform). He considers the elimination of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the action that der-
egulated the airline industry, as the quintessential example of case-by-case deregulation.
Id. at 14-16.
9 See George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy
Questions Stimulated by the "Check-the-Box" Regulations, 51 SMU L. REv. 125,130 (1997)
("In general, the tax system does not permit taxpayers to elect the rules applicable to them.
Rather, the system generally attempts to impose tax rules that follow and are consistent
with some economic characteristic of the taxpayer or the taxpayer's activities."). Fans of
The Matrix may see the freedom granted to taxpayers through tax deregulation as a more
banal, less benign version of Neo's discovery of his power to manipulate the rules of the
matrix. See THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. Pictures 1999).
10 See Joni L. Walser & Robert E. Culbertson, Encore Une Fois: Check-the-Box on the
International Stage, 76 TAX NoTEs 403, 405-06 (1997) (describing "dazzling" array of tax
planning opportunities available pursuant to check-the-box regulations).
11 See Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border
Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REv. 79, 96-100 (2002) (describing use of check-the-box "to
avoid some of the limitations and restrictions of the subpart F regime," which otherwise
controls taxation of multinational corporations).
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tive compliance spirals.12 As interpreted by Valerie Braithwaite and
others, responsive regulation reveals that tax deregulation's focus on
taxpayer autonomy can be both appropriate and useful. 13 Employing
the responsive regulation methodology, deregulatory strategies can
serve as tools that regulators use to calibrate the intensity of their
oversight to match the behavior and attitude of different types of tax-
payers.14 By "escalating" or deregulating down their control over tax-
payers, tax regulators may be able to encourage the development of
cooperative taxpayer norms.15 However appealing a robust link
between increased autonomy and increased compliance may be as a
theoretical matter, developing such a link in practice presents a
variety of challenges. 16
At the same time, tax deregulation permits policymakers to
engage in fiscal arbitrage, effectively reaping the political benefits of
spending without investing the political capital that direct spending
requires. 17 By substituting an economically equivalent tax benefit for
12 See infra Part II.B.2 (exploring responsive regulation in greater detail).
13 See generally TAXING DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING TAX AVOIDANCE AND
EVASION (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003) [hereinafter TAXING DEMOCRACY] (employing
responsive regulation framework in tax context).
14 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (1992) ("[R]egulation should respond to industry conduct
.... The very behavior of an industry or the firms therein should channel the regulatory
strategy to greater or lesser degrees of government intrusion.... By credibly asserting a
willingness to regulate more intrusively, responsive regulation can channel marketplace
transactions to less intrusive and less centralized forms of government intervention.").
15 Id. (describing responsive regulation paradigm for regulators' relationship with regu-
lated industry).
16 Private parties may accept greater autonomy while failing to embrace sincerely their
compliance obligations. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491-92 (2003) ("[T]he indicia of an effec-
tive compliance system are easily mimicked and true effectiveness is difficult for courts and
regulators to determine, particularly ex post."). Likewise, regulators may offer only a simu-
lacrum of greater autonomy to regulated entities. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing
Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 954 (2009) ("[C]orporate compliance regula-
tion ... is at best an illusory delegation of responsibility .... ").
17 This analysis assumes that even politically popular actions require policymakers to
expend valuable political capital. A rational, self-interested politician will, of course, only
deploy political capital if such an expenditure results in a net political benefit. Through
fiscal arbitrage, such a politician minimizes her expenditures of political capital while maxi-
mizing political benefit. One could even stretch the analogy to argue that fiscal arbitrage
eliminates political inefficiencies just as financial arbitrage eliminates market inefficiencies.
If one sees a Senate filibuster as a source of inefficiency, fiscal arbitrage that enabled use of
the reconciliation process (thereby avoiding the filibuster) could be seen as efficiency
enhancing. The inefficiency of the filibuster has perhaps received the most attention in the
context of judicial confirmation. See, e.g., John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation
Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 194 (2003)
(lamenting "[t]he indefinite, needless, and wasteful delay caused by filibusters of judicial
nominations").
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 86:387
TAX DEREGULATION
a spending provision, a policymaker can create what can be thought of
as a political "profit" analogous to the profits derived from financial
arbitrage. Just as an arbitrageur might buy cheaply in one market and
sell at a higher price in another simply by relabeling the product, fiscal
arbitrage allows policymakers to "buy" inexpensive tax breaks while
"selling" substantively identical-but more highly valued-spending
provisions. Fiscal arbitrage thus allows a policymaker to increase the
return on his investment of political capital. For example, tax deregu-
lation can permit lawmakers to benefit from cognitive fiscal arbitrage
in order to direct resources to favored constituencies-like tax prefer-
ences for hedge fund managers-in ways that the broader public sys-
tematically undervalues. 18 Combined with budgetary and procedural
fiscal arbitrage, such efforts can undermine important sources of fiscal
restraint.
Part I of the Article sets the stage by defining tax deregulation
and offering several examples of deregulatory tax reforms. Part II
takes a step back from the nuts and bolts of deregulation by first dis-
entangling tax deregulation from the related notion of tax simplifica-
tion and then developing a normative framework for evaluating tax
deregulation. Part III applies the normative framework developed in
Part II to the examples discussed in Part I and identifies the most
desirable deregulatory tax reforms.
I
DEREGULATION AND TAXES
Even before the current financial crisis thrust deregulation into
the headlines, scholars had spent decades debating its costs and bene-
fits. 19 Oddly, that has not been the case with tax deregulation.
Although lower tax rates and reduced tax complexity figure promi-
nently in the tax scholarship of the past thirty years, tax deregulation
itself has been relatively rarely and only recently addressed. 20
18 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Cognitive Theory and the Delivery of Welfare Benefits,
40 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 264 (2009) ("For example, the public might not tolerate handing
out dollars to every hedge fund trader, but will not notice if these traders receive the
money by means of favorable tax treatment."). This Article refers to this phenomenon as
cognitive fiscal arbitrage. See infra Part II.B.3.
19 See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 5 (1982) (proposing case-
by-case framework for analyzing costs and benefits of individual regulatory reforms);
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335,
335-36 (1974) (describing competing theories of regulation and endorsing one type of cap-
ture theory); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 3, 3 (1971) ("[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed
and operated primarily for its benefit.").
20 Only the responsive regulation scholarship focusing on tax administration addresses
tax deregulation, and even it avoids the term deregulation. See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, A
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To lay the foundation for the normative discussion in Parts II and
III of this Article, this Part provides a definition of tax deregulation. It
also provides three illustrations of deregulatory tax reforms: safe
harbor leasing, the best method rule for transfer pricing, and the liber-
alization of nonrecognition rules for divisive reorganizations.
Together, these reforms demonstrate both the longevity and the reach
of deregulation in the tax context.
A. Defining Tax Deregulation
Defining tax deregulation is challenging. Even more difficult is
explaining how it has gone unrecognized for so long. The collective
failure to acknowledge the phenomenon of tax deregulation is
remarkable in part because the impact of deregulation has been per-
vasive, affecting rules of all kinds.21 The broad reach of the tax laws
themselves make it even more difficult to imagine that deregulation
and taxation would never intersect. 22 It would have been extra-
ordinary for this sea change in regulatory culture to bypass what may
be the single most economically significant regulatory regime.
One could rationalize this lacuna by concluding that tax deregula-
tion is simply a contradiction in terms.23 At first blush, tax deregula-
tion is an oxymoron on the order of water dehumidification. If
deregulation generally means abandoning command-and-control
policies in favor of alternatives that grant private actors increased
autonomy at regulators' expense, tax deregulation calls for giving tax-
payers greater authority to determine their own tax treatment. 24
Since the tax laws distinguish among transactions according to
both their economic substance and their formal characteristics, it is
New Approach to Tax Compliance, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 13, at 1, 4
("Responsive regulation steps away from a command and control approach to regulation
.... "). Alice Abreu has articulated a similar concept which she refers to as "taxpayer
empowerment." Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1, 6 (1996) (defining empowerment as "the ability to affect either the amount of tax
that will be collected or the identity of the bearer of the resulting economic burden").
21 The phenomenon of deregulation has been so pervasive that even President Carter
has claimed to have deregulated a range of industries. See LIZABETH COHEN, A
CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 393
(2003) (noting President Carter's boasts of deregulating industries from trucking to finan-
cial services).
22 See, e.g., Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1943) ("No other branch of the
law touches human activities at so many points.").
23 That would be true, for example, if (i) deregulation serves the economic interests of
customers or other third parties rather than the direct objects of regulation, and (ii)
deregulatory tax changes have no particularized impact beyond the affected taxpayers.
24 A more conservative definition of deregulation might limit it to the dismantling of a
comprehensive regulatory apparatus governing an entire industry. See infra note 129
(citing Judge Posner's definition of deregulation).
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not obvious that moving beyond command-and-control is possible in
the tax context. While environmental laws can articulate emissions
targets and allow private parties to find low-cost ways of meeting
them,25 it makes little sense to think of tax laws as specifying a rev-
enue target and inviting taxpayers to determine the best way of col-
lecting that amount.
However, the hallmark of deregulation-an increase in private
autonomy at the expense of direct governmental control-can easily
be recognized in a number of significant business tax reforms imple-
mented in recent decades: the introduction of the check-the-box regu-
lations, the advent of safe-harbor leasing in the early 1980s, the
adoption of the best method rule for transfer pricing in the mid-1990s,
and the recent liberalization of nonrecognition provisions relating to
divisive reorganizations. 26
The introduction of the check-the-box entity classification rules
offers what may be the most striking instance of the deregulation of
the federal income tax.27 The older regulatory system prescribed pass-
through or corporate treatment to entities based on specified charac-
teristics. In light of the emergence of new types of state law business
entities-the most notable being the limited liability company 8-tax
policymakers revised their approach to entity classification. Particu-
larly, authorities were concerned that these new entities allowed tax-
payers to exploit gaps in the prevailing four-factor test.2 9
The new regime explicitly empowers taxpayers to choose, and
even change, those classifications. 30 Changing the classification of an
entity can constitute a significant transaction on its own. The classifi-
cation of an entity has dramatic implications for both its tax treatment
and the results of its transactions.31 To achieve those results, the
25 See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing market-based environ-
mental regulation).
26 See infra Part I.B.
27 See supra note 4 (discussing check-the-box regulations).
28 See Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the
Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 393-95 (1996) (describing rise of
limited liability company).
29 See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1629-30 (1999) ("The argument for abandoning the four-factor
test is that it was enormously inefficient. It merely caused people to shift their organiza-
tional structures without collecting any tax.").
30 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2010) (setting forth rules for elective classifications);
see also Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the
Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 22 (2010) ("Pursuant to these regu-
lations, an unincorporated business entity could choose its tax classification merely by
checking a box on a form .... ").
31 The resulting freedom in choosing one's classification has had profound conse-
quences for the tax system, few of which are consistent with check-the-box's simplification
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 20111
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
check-the-box rules merely require taxpayers to submit a form with
tax authorities shortly before or after the desired effective date.32
Although a basic understanding of tax deregulation can be
divined from this example, a coherent definition of tax deregulation
demands identifying not only what tax deregulation is, but also what it
is not. Tax deregulation, broadly construed, could encompass any
changes in the tax laws that increase taxpayer autonomy. The reduced
tax burden achieved by reducing tax rates, for example, permits tax-
payers greater freedom to swap labor for leisure and all the other
opportunities that a higher after-tax income provides. Yet tax deregu-
lation is distinct from that expansive notion of tax libertarianism.33
Instead, the term refers specifically to rule changes that offer tax-
payers greater freedom in their roles as taxpayers-i.e., greater
freedom in structuring transactions and reporting their results to tax
authorities.
To understand the nature of the structuring and reporting
autonomy that tax deregulation generates, it is easiest to begin with an
extreme example: a tax that offers taxpayers no opportunity to control
their tax treatment. A so-called "head tax" imposes an identical lump-
sum burden on each individual taxpayer.34 Taxpayers have no oppor-
tunity to alter that burden by, for example, marrying, shifting income
among individuals or time periods, or recharacterizing wages as
investment proceeds. Such taxes have been enacted but are relatively
objective. Cf Dean, supra note 6, at 453-57 (describing rule complexity and tax planning
opportunities for foreign corporations created by check-the-box election); Ring, supra
note 11, at 96-100 (describing impact of check-the-box election in context of foreign busi-
ness organizations). So-called check-and-sell transactions-in which taxpayers change the
classification of a foreign entity immediately prior to a sale to secure advantageous tax
treatment-provide one illustration. Tax authorities unsuccessfully attempted to rein in
these transactions by issuing regulations. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(h)(1), 64 Fed.
Reg. 66,591, 66,594 (Nov. 29, 1999) (proposing change); I.R.S. Notice 2003-46, 2003-28
I.R.B. 53 (withdrawing Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(h)).
32 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iii) (specifying timetable for filing classification
elections); I.R.S. Form 8832 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf
(explaining how to change entity classification under check-the-box regime).
33 A good illustration of the tax libertarian impulse is the Tea Party's Contract from
America. The Contract from America, CONT. FROM AM., http://www.thecontract.org/
the-contract-from-america/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). It calls for the "[p]ermanent[ ]
repeal [of] all tax hikes, including those to the income, capital gains, and death taxes, cur-
rently scheduled to begin in 2011" as part of its effort to promote "individual liberty, lim-
ited government, and economic freedom." Id.; cf. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE
MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 15 (2002) (explaining that notion "that pretax market outcomes are
presumptively just" underlies libertarian conclusion that increased taxpayer autonomy is
desirable in and of itself).
34 See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415,
421 (2003) (defining head tax as one "that is exactly the same regardless of individual
economic circumstances").
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rare.35 The absence of autonomy that is the essence of a head tax
makes it supremely efficient, if unappealing.36 Since taxpayers cannot
lower their tax burden by acting strategically, wasteful tax planning
simply does not occur.
An income tax that offered taxpayers absolutely no autonomy
would, like the head tax, prescribe the precise tax consequences of any
taxpayer behavior. Taxpayers would have no freedom to alter those
results. A tax system as complex as the U.S. income tax, however,
inevitably offers taxpayers opportunities to shape their tax fate.
For example, the U.S. income tax encourages married couples to
report their income jointly.37 By deciding if and when to marry, tax-
payers can materially increase or decrease the amount of income tax
they pay.38 A couple willing to bear the legal consequences could
divorce in one year and remarry in the next to optimize their tax treat-
ment. 39 This capacity to influence tax outcomes by arranging one's
affairs in a specific manner is "structural autonomy. '40
35 The most notable recent exception occurred in Britain under Margaret Thatcher,
with predictably disastrous results. See Eric M. Zolt, Prospects for Fundamental Tax
Reform: United States vs. Japan, 83 TAX NoTEs 903, 905 (1999) ("While a head tax may
strike some as fair, the fall of Margaret Thatcher's government regarding replacing a prop-
erty tax with a per person 'community charge' illustrates the political costs of misreading
what the public considers fair.").
36 Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357, 1378 (2001) ("All taxes
have efficiency costs; they change incentives to engage in various activities and affect the
allocation of resources. If economic efficiency were the sole goal of tax policy, we would
see only per capita taxes, head taxes.").
37 See I.R.C. § 7703 (2006) (defining marital status). Married taxpayers may not file as
individuals, but they can file "married filing separately" returns. Such returns are taxed on
a higher rate schedule than individual returns and are not eligible for certain credits, such
as the Earned Income Tax Credit. I.R.C. § 32(d) (2006). "Married filing separately" is gen-
erally less advantageous than joint filing. Field, supra note 30, at 64-65 n.248.
38 See Field, supra note 30, at 64-65 (discussing tax planning opportunities available to
married couples).
39 Marital status for tax purposes is determined on the last day of each year. I.R.C.
§ 7703(a)(1). In extreme cases, tax authorities have successfully challenged taxpayer
attempts at sham divorces. See, e.g., Boyter v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 989, 990, 1001 (1980)
(rejecting annual tax-motivated Haitian divorces of taxpayers domiciled in Maryland on
ground that "Maryland would not recognize the foreign divorces as valid to terminate the
marriage"). In less dramatic cases-in which the state law status of a divorce is unques-
tioned-the tax law contemplates that a divorced couple that continues to live together
might be treated as unmarried but nonetheless ineligible for specific types of preferential
treatment ordinarily granted to recently divorced couples. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(C)
(2006) (providing that payment may not be treated as alimony if "the payee spouse and the
payor spouse are.., members of the same household at the time such payment is made").
40 The terms "structural autonomy" and "reporting autonomy" are modeled after cate-
gories used to describe complexity in the tax system. David Bradford separates complexity
into three elements: rule complexity, transactional complexity, and compliance complexity.
DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266-67 (1999). Rule complexity
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In contrast, "reporting autonomy" implicates only those choices a
taxpayer makes in characterizing their status and activities when
reporting them to tax authorities. The most straightforward example
of reporting autonomy may be the realization requirement.41 While
the term "realization" may be unfamiliar, the realization requirement
is a feature of the income tax that any shareholder or homeowner
understands. Under a realization regime, economic gain or loss may
accrue over time as the value of the shares or home rises and falls, but
no income or loss needs to be reported before a sale of the shares or
the home. 42 In a sense, the realization requirement represents a con-
cession to the administrative difficulties that would arise from a
system in which economic income is taken into account on a current
basis.43 Whatever the justification, giving taxpayers the capacity to
choose when to trigger gains and losses by disposing of property offers
them extraordinary control over the timing of their income.44
Both structural and reporting autonomy may come at the expense
of tax simplicity. Individual taxpayers, particularly those whose
incomes consist only of wages, have relatively simple tax lives. 45 As a
result, they enjoy relatively little autonomy. Conversely, a typical bus-
relates to the process of understanding the relevant tax rules. Transactional and compli-
ance complexity are functions of actions taken-and choices made-by taxpayers. The
structuring choices taxpayers make determine the transactional complexity costs they
incur. Compliance complexity is affected by reporting choices made by taxpayers.
41 Alice Abreu discusses the ways in which the income tax "empowers" taxpayers,
including through rules such as realization. Abreu, supra note 20, at 8-9 ("Because the
grant of the power to choose can affect who is taxed and how much they are taxed, an
analysis of the ways in which tax systems empower and a determination of who it is that
they empower should become a standard part of tax policy analysis.").
42 See David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986) (describing realization requirement and its
alternatives).
43 To avoid potential valuation and liquidity issues, a taxpayer is generally only taxed
on a disposition of an asset, not on fluctuations in its value. See I.R.C. § 1001 (2006) (deter-
mining "gain from the sale or other disposition of property" by comparing "adjusted basis"
in property (usually amount paid less depreciation taken previously) to amount received
upon disposition). By choosing when to dispose of property, taxpayers also choose when
the economic income from the property will be taxed. The realization requirement may be
desirable for administrative reasons, but it is not inevitable.
44 The extent of taxpayer control is famously illustrated by a Supreme Court case
allowing troubled savings and loans institutions to trigger losses for tax purposes with vir-
tually no nontax implications. See Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 559-60,
565-66 (1991) (rejecting government claim that exchange of mortgage derivatives in ques-
tion should be ignored for tax purposes "because the underlying mortgages were essen-
tially economic substitutes").
45 See BRADFORD, supra note 40, at 268 ("Although the statutes and regulations fill
thousands of all but unreadable pages, actual compliance with current law is ... simple for
the majority of individual taxpayers. Taxpayers who do not claim itemized deductions and
whose income is mainly from wages can very quickly and easily compute their taxes.").
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iness taxpayer may enjoy quite a bit of both structural and reporting
autonomy while being burdened with significantly more complexity. 46
Tax deregulation provides taxpayers a combination of greater
reporting and structural autonomy and enables taxpayers to choose
the tax consequences of their activities.
Returning to the joint filing example, policymakers could
increase individuals' structural autonomy by respecting a valid mar-
riage or divorce from any jurisdiction. 47 An election permitting a
couple to file jointly irrespective of their marital status would provide
greater reporting autonomy.48 Often, taxpayers will exploit that
increased autonomy to achieve a reduced tax burden.49
In some cases, taxpayers may affirmatively choose a higher tax
burden to promote nontax interests.50 For example, foreign investors
in the United States may choose to pay more tax than necessary by
forgoing available tax benefits in order to avoid filing a U.S. tax
return. In that case, they may rationally have chosen to protect their
financial privacy at the risk of a higher tax burden. For some foreign
taxpayers, anonymity may warrant taking a significant risk by
declining to file a "protective" return.5 1
46 See, e.g., id. at 270-71 (discussing tax complexity of business transactions).
47 Current law, by contrast, requires that the marriage or divorce be valid in the tax-
payer's domicile to be respected for tax purposes. See, e.g., Lee v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 552,
559 (1975) ("Since we have found the domicile of both parties to be California, we must
look to California law to determine the marital status of Harold and Louise during the
years in issue, and specifically to the effect under California law of the Mexican decree.").
48 In some cases, the two types of autonomy will be in tension. For example, under a
nonelective regime, taxpayers have the freedom to change their tax burden by marrying or
divorcing. If joint filing were purely elective, marriage or divorce would be irrelevant and
taxpayers would lose some amount of structural autonomy. In other cases, structuring and
reporting autonomy may exhibit a synergistic relationship. The check-the-box election
illustrates that potential for synergy. Taxpayers' freedom to classify entities gave them new
opportunities to engage in tax planning.
49 See Abreu, supra note 20, at 12 (referring to this increased autonomy as "avoidance
power").
50 One could imagine, for example, a same-sex couple attempting to pay the heightened
tax burden referred to as the "marriage penalty" in protest against federal rules precluding
married gay or lesbian couples from filing jointly as other married couples do. See
Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Protest, "a Homosexual," and Frivolity: A Deconstructionist
Meditation, 24 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 21, 58 (2005) (challenging married same-sex
couples to reject "the darkness of the tax closet" by filing joint returns).
51 A protective return is a return reporting no U.S. taxable income, filed merely to
"protect the right to receive the benefit of the deductions and credits" in the event that a
foreign taxpayer is later determined to be subject to U.S. tax. Treas. Reg. § 1.874-1(b)(6)
(2002); see also Stephen E. Shay et al.,"What's Source Got To Do With It?" Source Rules
and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 130 (2002) ("[N]otwithstanding the
risk-adverse nature of the taxpayer's advisors, the sensible business judgment often is not
to file [a protective income tax return]. Absent a return, it would be extremely difficult for
the Service to be aware that there might be an issue.").
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B. Deregulatory Business Tax Reforms
Deregulatory efforts to increase structural and reporting
autonomy implicate a broad swath of the federal income tax, particu-
larly its corporate provisions. This Section highlights three examples
of deregulatory business tax reforms. Safe harbor leasing is one of the
earliest high-profile examples of tax deregulation.52 The introduction
of the best method rule in the 1990s represented a significant change
in the operation of the transfer pricing rules designed to prevent cross-
border tax abuses by multinational businesses. 53 Recent modifications
to the requirements for divisive tax-free corporate reorganizations
provide the final example. 54
These three examples address three very different-but funda-
mental-challenges posed by the income tax.55 Those challenges are,
respectively: (i) identifying the owner of favorable tax attributes, (ii)
allocating income among related taxpayers, and (iii) determining
when economic income should be taxed. Historically, such determina-
tions have been made pursuant to command-and-control regimes that,
52 Safe harbor leasing was introduced by statute. See I.R.C. § 168(f)(8) (Supp. V 1982)
(repealed 1982). The provision was soon repealed. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 §§ 208-209, I.R.C. § 168(f), (i), (j) (2006); see also Alvin C. Warren, Jr. & Alan
J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1752 (1982) ("The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 introduced a
federal income tax 'safe harbor' for leasing transactions in order to distribute the benefits
of the investment tax credit (ITC) and the newly enacted Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS) throughout the corporate sector.").
53 The best method rule was implemented via regulation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)
(2010); see also Robert G. Clark, Comment, Transfer Pricing, Section 482, and
International Tax Conflict: Getting Harmonized Income Allocation Measures from
Multinational Cacophony, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1155, 1191-92 (1993) ("In response to com-
ments on the proposed regulations, the IRS acknowledged that problems exist with
imposing a rigid hierarchy for applying valuation methods and therefore promulgated the
'best method rule."').
54 I.R.C. § 355(b)(3) (Supp. I 2006) (treating affiliated groups as single entity for pur-
poses of active trade or business requirement). This provision was passed in 2006 as part of
the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005. Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 202,
120 Stat. 348 (2006). In introducing the legislation, Senator Baucus stated that the purpose
of the new amendment was to "simply apply a 'look through' rule for the 'active trade or
business' test on an affiliated group level, so that parent holding companies could count the
active businesses of its subsidiaries." 151 CONG. REc. S7616 (daily ed. June 29, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Max Baucus).
55 As Part II shows, labeling these provisions "simplification" is at best incomplete. By
shifting the balance away from command-and-control regulation and toward increased pri-
vate autonomy, these reforms deregulated more than they simplified. That increase in
autonomy is easiest to recognize in the case of the best method rule. The adjective most
frequently used to describe the best method rule is "flexible." See, e.g., T.D. 8552, 1994-2
C.B. 93, 95 ("The best method rule adopts a flexible approach under which the determina-
tion of which method is most accurate depends on the facts and circumstances of the
case.").
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with varying degrees of success, attempt to categorize actions and
events according to their underlying economic substance.5 6 Each of
the reforms described below takes a different approach by affirma-
tively shifting the balance between public and private control in favor
of taxpayer autonomy.
1. Safe Harbor Leasing
As any student in an introductory law school tax class learns,
identifying a taxpayer's income is only one of many steps in the pro-
cess of determining how much tax must be paid. Often, the greater
challenge involves determining the "timing" of that income and
whether deductions and credits are available to offset it.5 7 Because
such credits and deductions ordinarily can only reduce tax obligations
to zero, even the most generous tax benefit may be of no help to tax-
payers operating at a loss or whose tax benefits exceed their income in
a given year. Like a shipwreck survivor adrift on the ocean, a business
can die of thirst while floating in a sea of theoretically valuable tax
benefits. 58
The determination of which entity may take advantage of a
deduction or credit is normally made by reference to the ownership of
the property to which those tax attributes relate.5 9 In other words, if a
taxpayer does not own property, the tax law does not entitle her to
enjoy the tax benefits derived from that property. Without transfer-
ring the underlying property, it is generally difficult to shift the
attendant tax benefits. 60 The safe harbor leasing rules created a
56 The common law rules governing the assignment of income from one taxpayer to
another offer an example of such a regime. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930)
(providing that income generally may not be assigned among taxpayers so that "tax
[cannot] be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully
devised"). The recently enacted economic substance statute, codifying a longstanding
common law doctrine, offers another illustration. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o) (West 2010)
(providing that transactions will be taxed in accordance with their economic substance, no
matter how taxpayers attempt to classify them).
57 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 648-51 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing centrality and value of timing decisions to
taxpayers).
58 One such benefit is Net Operating Losses (NOLs), which offer business taxpayers
the opportunity to write off a business loss in years other than those in which the loss is
incurred. See I.R.C. § 172 (2006) (providing that taxpayers can carry over net business
losses to different taxable years). Yet this benefit may not be able to save some taxpayers.
A taxpayer that never earns any income will receive no benefit from the tax law's generous
NOL provisions no matter how many such losses they accumulate.
59 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 167(a) (2006) (providing that owner of property used in trade or
business is entitled to "reasonable allowance for [its] exhaustion, wear and tear").
60 Tax shelter transactions that accomplish a transfer of tax benefits are the exceptions
that prove the rule. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778, 779-80 (5th
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(short-lived) exception by separating enjoyment of tax benefits from
ownership. 61
Safe harbor leasing offers taxpayers a means of extracting cash
from otherwise useless tax benefits by assigning them to another tax-
payer. Safe harbor leasing is not unique simply because it permitted
taxpayers to allocate favorable tax attributes among themselves. 62
What is unusual about safe harbor leasing is the extent to which
Congress explicitly empowered taxpayers to transfer those benefits to
other entities. 63 Allowing taxpayers to monetize idle tax benefits64
Cir. 2001) (describing steps taken-including forty-six trades, hiring of third-party arbi-
trage specialists, and use of margin accounts-to shift favorable tax attributes).
61 Safe harbor leasing met a quick demise as a result of public backlash. This response
seems to have been provoked more by press accounts of particular abuses than by an
aversion to its design or concerns about its cost. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr. & Alan J.
Auerbach, Tax Policy and Equipment Leasing After TEFRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1581
(1983) (concluding that "several widely publicized cases of safe harbor leasing that were
considered abusive" pushed Congress to modify safe harbor leasing rules, in part by
replacing safe harbor leases with finance leases). Finance leasing, the more modest suc-
cessor to safe harbor leasing, remains an important feature of the tax landscape. Id. at
1581-82 ("[S]afe harbor leasing was repealed for property leased after December 31, 1983,
and was replaced by a new statutory category, 'finance leases,' effective in 1984."). Both
finance leases and safe harbor leases are essentially alternative ways of financing the
purchase of capital equipment. Absent tax implications, the titles "lessee" and "lessor"
would simply be replaced by "purchaser" and "lender." See Alex Raskolnikov, Contextual
Analysis of Tax Ownership, 85 B.U. L. REV. 431, 471-72 (2005) ("If a lease were
recharacterized as a sale combined with a loan from seller-lessor to buyer-lessee, the lessee
would be treated as the owner of the property and would be precluded from deducting the
entire amount paid to the lessor as rent. The lessor, in turn, would be denied depreciation
deductions.").
62 Transactions such as the one in which Compaq shifted the benefits of foreign tax
credits from a non-taxpaying entity to a taxpaying entity work in much the same way. See
Compaq Computer Corp., 277 F.3d at 782 (rejecting Tax Court's finding that "the intention
and effect of the transaction were to capture a tax credit, not substantive ownership").
63 Warren & Auerbach, supra note 52, at 1762-63 (discussing safe harbor leasing as
aberration from general tax rules).
64 Indeed, this was Congress's goal:
Congress was concerned ... that the investment tax credits would be of little
use to companies that needed to buy new machinery but had no profits and
thus no taxes to reduce. So the legislators allowed such companies, in effect, to
sell their tax breaks to wealthier businesses, which would buy the machinery
on paper, take the tax credits and lease the equipment back to the poorer
companies, which would then use it.
George J. Church & Evan Thomas, Stewing in Its Own Largesse: Congress Discovers that
Log Rolling Helped Flatten the Economy, TIME, Feb. 1, 1982, at 16; see also Philip J.
Harmelink & Nancy E. Shurtz, Sale-Leaseback Transactions Involving Real Estate: A
Proposal for Defined Tax Rules, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 833, 854 (1982) ("Congress was con-
cerned that many corporations would lack both sufficient profits to use the tax benefits and
the funds necessary to make the desired capital investments."); Emil M. Sunley,
Depreciation and Leasing Under the New Tax Law, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 287, 289 (1982)
("Under the [common safe harbor leasing technique], the user 'sells' the property to the
investor/lessor for a cash payment and a note. The user then leases the property back with
the rental payments just equal to the payments on the note.").
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created what Alan Greenspan called "food stamps for undernourished
corporations. ' 65 By entering into a safe harbor lease, a taxpayer could
in essence sell bare tax benefits to another private party.66
In a typical safe harbor leasing transaction, the transfer of tax
benefits from a hypothetical Lean Corp. to a hypothetical Lush Corp.
might be accomplished by having Lush purchase capital equipment
from Lean, only to lease the property back to Lean.67 For property
worth $100, Lush might pay Lean $27.20 as a down payment.68 That
down payment will be the only cash to change hands since rent and
finance charges will offset one another. 69 In exchange, Lush-now
deemed to be the owner of the $100 property for tax purposes-will
be entitled to claim tax benefits with a present value of $27.20.70
Assuming that Lean is in dire financial straits, it could absorb the
$27.20 of additional income it earns from the transaction without
adverse tax consequences. 71 Lush, on the other hand, will effectively
deduct the down payment. 72 The end result is difficult to distinguish
from a purchase of tax benefits from Lean by Lush.
By creating a market in tax benefits, Congress pursued a classic
deregulatory strategy. Much like cap-and-trade in the environmental
context, the market for tax benefits created by safe harbor leasing
allowed private actors to allocate financial rewards for desirable
behavior (here, capital investment). In a narrow sense, the result of a
safe harbor lease is precisely the same as a command-and-control
alternative:7 3 It makes the underlying tax benefits fully refundable.74
Rather than receiving cash directly from the government in the form
65 Church & Thomas, supra note 64, at 16.
66 This represented both "a significant deviation from the traditional dominance of sub-
stance over form in determining ownership for tax purposes" and a substantial change
from prior law. Warren & Auerbach, supra note 52, at 1762. As Warren and Auerbach
note, "[allthough leveraged leases were used to transfer the [Investment Tax Credit] and
accelerated depreciation before the 1981 Act, transfer of these tax benefits, which are
attributes of ownership, required the transfer of sufficient nontax ownership rights to the
lessor." Id. at 1762-63.
67 The taxpayer with unusable credits sells the underlying property and leases it back
from the purported purchaser. See Sunley, supra note 64, at 289 (outlining basic mechanics
of such transactions).
68 See Warren & Auerbach, supra note 52, at 1764-65 (showing that $27.20 is present
value of this investment).
69 Id. at 1763.
70 Id. at 1765.
71 Id. at 1766.
72 Id.
73 If the income tax allowed taxpayers to receive a refund whenever their credits and
deductions more than offset their tax liabilities, the inability to transfer tax benefits would
be less problematic. Some particular provisions do allow such refunds for individuals. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 32 (2006) (providing for refundable Earned Income Tax Credit). Since such
refunds are generally not available, tax benefits are often more valuable to one taxpayer
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of a refund, businesses that make investments but pay too little in tax
to digest available tax incentives could sell those benefits to a
counterparty. 75
2. Section 482's Best Method Rule
Multinational enterprises enjoy tremendous geographic freedom
in the way they structure their affairs. 76 With their research, manufac-
turing, and sales infrastructure scattered across the globe, these corpo-
rate taxpayers face extraordinary challenges in allocating the resulting
income into particular jurisdictions for taxation purposes-a process
referred to as "transfer pricing." Imagine a business that not only sells,
but also develops, contact lenses. Transfer pricing attempts to allocate
a hypothetical dollar of profit among the relevant jurisdictions when
those contact lenses are developed, manufactured, and sold in dif-
ferent jurisdictions by the various interrelated entities within a
multinational corporation.71
Transfer pricing often simulates pricing in arm's-length transac-
tions in order to appropriately allocate tax liability.78 By compelling
commonly controlled taxpayers to interact as though they were unre-
lated, the arm's-length standard ensures that multinationals do not
manipulate the prices paid in related-party transactions to lower their
than they are to another. Safe harbor leases permitted a tax-indifferent entity with an
essentially useless tax benefit to "sell" it to a taxpaying entity.
74 Despite the rough economic equivalence of safe harbor leasing and a direct subsidy
for business investment, as a tax expenditure, safe harbor leasing offered legislators an
opportunity to engage in cognitive and procedural (but not budgetary) arbitrage. See
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 52, at 1779 (concluding that both refundability and
explicit transferability of relevant tax benefits would suffice as mechanisms to achieve
policy objectives of safe harbor leasing). By comparison with an equivalent command-and-
control tax expenditure, the safe harbor leasing rules granted taxpayers a relatively high
degree of autonomy. Using a deregulatory approach meant that policymakers sacrificed a
considerable degree of their power to control the parameters of the benefit. See id. at 1773
("The fiction of leasing thus dominates the purpose of the safe harbor in determining the
amount of tax benefits that can be transferred.").
75 Id. at 1763 (explaining that in typical safe harbor leasing transaction, lessor made
"cash payment to the lessee for tax benefits [that] is characterized as a down payment on
the purchase price"). Although the source of the incentive payment distinguishes safe
harbor leasing from most tax expenditures, safe harbor leasing otherwise fits the tax expen-
diture mold quite comfortably.
76 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 3, at 1589-90 (describing geographic dispersion of opera-
tions of Intel and General Motors).
77 This is not as easy as it may sound. See Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Comm'r, 933 F.2d
1084, 1090-91 (2d Cir. 1991) (resolving multimillion dollar dispute between U.S. tax
authorities and developer, manufacturer, and seller of contact lenses).
78 See I.R.C. § 482 (2006) (empowering Treasury Secretary to reapportion income,
deductions, credits, or allowances to prevent tax evasion).
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global tax bill.79 If left unchecked, multinationals could over- or
under-charge related counterparties in different jurisdictions, allowing
them to shift profits to locations offering favorable tax treatment
without altering their underlying business operations.8 0
Although it is hard to find fault with the arm's-length standard at
a conceptual level, reducing that standard to practice can be chal-
lenging. Because the arm's-length principle requires tax authorities
and taxpayers to quantify a counterfactual-what would the price be
but for the relationship between the parties?-there is no obvious way
to arrive at the correct result.81 To account for differences among tax-
payers and industries, tax regulations provide multiple allocation tech-
niques.82 Before the introduction of the best method rule, the
regulations also specified a "[piriority of methods" that both tax-
payers and the government were obligated to observe. 83
By contrast, the best method rule invites taxpayers to determine
which method allows them to best demonstrate their compliance with
transfer pricing rules. Thus, it increases taxpayer autonomy by trans-
ferring the power to choose a method from tax authorities to tax-
payers. That deregulatory change provides taxpayers with greater
latitude to characterize their activities.84 Rather than "imposing a
rigid hierarchy for applying valuation methods," the regulations call
for taxpayers to choose the best possible method for their particular
circumstances. 85 Taxpayers must then prepare a detailed contempora-
neous report comparing their own pricing practices to the results pro-
79 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution
of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAx REv. 89, 90 (1995).
80 Id. ("[T]ransfer pricing manipulation is one of the most common techniques of tax
avoidance. This is especially true in the international sphere, as there are great differences
in effective tax rates among jurisdictions.").
81 See Brian Lebowitz, Profit Sharing as a New World Order in International Taxation,
52 TAX NoTEs INYT'L 585, 586 (2008) ("What would happen if, contrary to fact, a group of
related companies, or geographic units of a single company, were unrelated companies
acting at arm's length regarding each other? Addressing this question requires delineating
numerous features of this hypothetical world.").
82 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a) (2010) (outlining transfer pricing options).
83 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(2)(iii), 57 Fed. Reg. 3571, 3580 (Jan. 30, 1992)
(describing priority of methods applicable to transfers of intellectual property); see also
Avi-Yonah, supra note 79, at 107-08 (1995) (describing operation of early arm's-length
transfer pricing regulations).
84 It could be argued that the flexible approach of the best method rule favors the
government more than taxpayers. Since tax authorities are not bound by taxpayers' choice
of methods, the rule may be "an illusory delegation of responsibility." Baer, supra note 16,
at 954.
85 Clark, supra note 53, at 1191-92.
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duced by their chosen method.86 Authorities can request that report
and test its conclusions. 87
3. Liberalizing the Divisive Reorganization Requirements
The realization requirement described above identifies points in
time at which a taxpayer's legal entitlements have been altered suffi-
ciently to justify imposing taxation.88 In some situations, Congress has
determined that despite meeting the realization threshold, further
deferral of tax liability is warranted. In those cases, it creates a statu-
tory exception called nonrecognition. 89 The final example of a deregu-
latory tax reform directed at businesses involves one such exception, a
type of tax-free corporate reorganization called a divisive reorganiza-
tion. In a divisive reorganization, an existing corporation spins off part
of its operations, assets, and liabilities into a completely new and
independent corporation. 90
For example, a Wall Street bank (Bank Inc.) might be compelled
by post-financial crisis regulations to separate its proprietary trading
from the remainder of its operations. One means of accomplishing
that division without triggering corporate- or shareholder-level taxes
would be for Bank Inc. to form a new subsidiary (Trading Corp.) to
house its proprietary trading operations and then distribute Trading
Corp.'s shares pro rata to Bank Inc.'s existing shareholders as a divi-
dend. The result would be two corporations owned by the same group
of shareholders, but otherwise independent of one another.
The basic statutory provisions regarding nonrecognition have
long played a central role in the corporate income tax. 91 Since the
86 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2) (2010). At the margins, taxpayers undoubtedly choose
methods that provide more favorable results. Since they must explain their choices to tax
authorities, however, their capacity to take aggressive positions is constrained.
87 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii) (2010) (specifying documentation requirements
for exception to transfer pricing valuation misstatement penalty). Taxpayers have an
opportunity to demonstrate their desire to cooperate with authorities, and regulators are
able to identify and focus their attention on taxpayers that fail to do so. That direct interac-
tion between taxpayers and tax authorities creates an avenue for generating increased
compliance.
88 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing realization).
89 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031 (2006) (providing tax deferral for certain types of property
exchanges).
90 See I.R.C. § 355(a)(1) (listing basic requirements for tax-deferred corporate
divisions).
91 Gregory v. Helvering, which gave birth to the economic substance doctrine, involved
an attempt to spin off a portion of a company's assets tax free. 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935)
(rejecting validity of taxpayer's transactions because "to hold otherwise would be to exalt
artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious
purpose").
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mid-1980s, they have taken on a new importance. 92 The tax-free
reorganization rules provide a valuable respite from the corporate-
and shareholder-level taxes that a corporate division would ordinarily
trigger. 93 Nonrecognition rules have been structured to provide tax
benefits for divisions that address corporate business exigencies,
rather than those that serve the interests of shareholders by distrib-
uting accumulated profits.94 The most important of those require-
ments, the "active trade or business" test, calls for each of the
corporations in a simple spinoff-i.e., both the one preexisting corpo-
ration and the two post-division corporations-to operate a substan-
tial business with a meaningful track record. 95 Historically, the
determination of whether a corporation was engaged in such a busi-
ness has been made on a corporation-by-corporation basis.96 If an oth-
erwise adequate predivision business were divided among several
entities to satisfy regulatory requirements, it might be the case that
none of those corporations would meet the requirement
independently.97
As a result, satisfying the active trade or business requirement
frequently forced businesses to restructure their assets and activities in
advance of the divisive reorganization, sometimes at significant cost. 98
Critics of the prior rules objected to the apparently arbitrary require-
92 Since 1986, corporate divisions-dividing the assets and operations of a single corpo-
ration into two separate corporations-generally result in current taxation at both the cor-
porate and shareholder levels. See Michael L. Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the
Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L. REV. 239, 244 (2003) ("In the Tax Reform Act of 1986 . . . .
Congress eliminated most of the methods for a corporate group to transfer assets outside
the group without gain recognition.").
93 See id. at 244-45 ("[A]fter the 1986 Act, the principal remaining method of achieving
this result is under § 355 (or a divisive D reorganization). This has caused taxpayers to
attempt to stretch § 355 to its limits, and has put much pressure on the requirements of
§ 355.").
94 In Gregory, the Supreme Court decided that the corporate division in question was
not motivated by business exigencies, but rather by shareholder interests, such that it was
not eligible for nonrecognition. 293 U.S. at 469.
95 I.R.C. § 355(b) (Supp. I 2006). In Gregory, for example, the newly formed Averill
Corporation did nothing but hold an appreciated minority position in the stock of Monitor
Corporation. 293 U.S. at 467. Under the modern statute, these limited holdings, as merely
passive investments, would violate the active trade or business requirement.
96 See Debra J. Bennett, New Code Sec. 355(b)(3): The Affiliated Group Active Trade
or Business Requirement, TAXEs, Aug. 2006, at 7, 7-9 (describing historical operation of
active trade or business requirement in affiliated group setting).
97 Id. at 8-9 ("[T]he question becomes why, from a policy perspective the rules exist in
the context of affiliated groups that are engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business
but have compartmentalized their businesses so that the active trade or business require-
ment of Code Sec. 355(b)(2)(A) cannot be satisfied.").
98 See Schler, supra note 92, at 263 ("The restructuring of a group that is necessary to
meet the trade or business requirements ... can take an enormous amount of time and
effort.").
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ment that businesses either structure their operations in a particular,
possibly disadvantageous manner in anticipation of a future division
or engage in a substantively meaningless preliminary transaction. 99 In
2006, Congress revised the applicable statute to apply the active trade
or business test on an aggregate basis, greatly reducing the need for
both types of tax planning.100 Under this test, the active trade or busi-
ness requirement can be met by looking at the activities of a collection
of related corporations, referred to as a "separate affiliated group,"
rather than those of each individual corporation.1 1
The 2006 reform constituted a typical deregulatory tax reform. It
did not create a market for tax benefits like safe harbor leasing or
encourage self-regulation of the sort promoted by the best method
rule. Nevertheless, the changes to the divisive reorganization rules
gave businesses more freedom to alter the timing of the corporate-
and shareholder-level taxes that would otherwise accompany a corpo-
rate division. It should be noted that, although the revised require-
ments have increased taxpayer autonomy, they have not necessarily
increased simplicity as hoped.'0 2
Coupled with the other requirements for nonrecognition treat-
ment, the 2006 reform increased business taxpayers' structural
autonomy in the same way that the hypothetical rule recognizing mar-
riages and divorces from any jurisdiction would.10 3 Both changes
would grant taxpayers greater flexibility to achieve favorable tax
results by severing relationships. Put another way, these changes
would facilitate tax planning by eliminating either the need (i) to
establish residency in, for example, Haiti to ensure a sufficiently
99 See id. ("[T]he restructuring makes no business sense and is done solely to satisfy the
statutory requirement.").
100 See I.R.C. § 355(b)(3); see also Robert Willens, Holding Companies and the Active
Business Test, 113 TAX NoTEs 87, 87-88 (2006) (explaining how changes to divisive reor-
ganization rules eliminated need for "corrective action" to satisfy active trade or business
test on stand-alone basis); infra note 102 (describing amendment of active trade or busi-
ness test).
101 I.R.C. § 355(b)(3).
102 See Martin J. McMahon et al., Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation: The
Year 2007, 8 FLA. TAX REv. 715, 792 (2008) (describing these legislative reforms as "sim-
plify[ing] the active trade or business test by looking at all corporations in the distributing
corporation's and the distributed subsidiary's affiliated groups to determine if the active
trade or business test is satisfied" but noting that "[piroposed regulations to carry out the
amendment are anything but simple").
103 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing current law requirement that
marriage and divorce be recognized in taxpayer's jurisdiction of residence). Eliminating
structural constraints, however, will not always increase taxpayer autonomy. For example,
if loosening the active trade or business test forces a corporation into nonrecognition when
it would have preferred a current tax liability, the changes would have reduced its
autonomy.
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strong link to Haiti to be confident that a Haitian divorce will be con-
sidered relevant by U.S. tax authorities, or (ii) to create a particular
corporate structure to ensure that the entity in question satisfies a
stand-alone active trade or business test.1 04
I1
EVALUATING TAX DEREGULATION
The preceding examples suggest the ubiquity of tax deregulatory
efforts. This Part shows that tax deregulation's broad impact has been
masked by a longstanding confusion between tax deregulation and tax
simplification. The check-the-box election provides a relatively
straightforward example of this confusion. People have also character-
ized the other deregulatory tax reforms described in the previous Part
as providing some relief from tax complexity, though the validity of
that claim is questionable. 10 5
On its face, such widespread and longstanding confusion between
simplification and deregulation is troubling. More worrisome still is
the degree to which that confusion obscures the difficult normative
questions raised by tax deregulation. Determining whether deregula-
tion is desirable or harmful, always a difficult task, becomes impos-
sible when it is mistaken for simplification. 106 This Part begins the
104 Rather than incurring the expense and disruption of relocating to a permissive juris-
diction or satisfying onerous requirements of their home jurisdiction, couples could fly to
Haiti or Mexico, confident that tax authorities would respect a "quickie" Haitian or
Mexican divorce. Similarly, by eliminating the need for predivision maneuvering, the modi-
fication to the active trade or business test serves the same purpose, providing taxpayers
with greater freedom to achieve their desired tax treatment by engaging in the corporate
equivalent of divorce.
105 See, e.g., 1 BoIs I. BITI-'KER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS T 11.05[5] (7th ed. Supp. II 2010) ("The 2006 Legis-
lative amendment to § 355(b)(3) was intended as a simplification; by treating affiliated
groups as a single entity for § 355(b) active business requirement, it was thought that cor-
porations would no longer need to engage in various restructuring efforts in order to posi-
tion themselves for a spin-off transaction."); Avi-Yonah, supra note 79, at 140 (describing
proposed regulations ultimately replaced by best method rule as "incredibly complex,
requiring the application of statistical methods far beyond the understanding of most tax
directors of even the largest corporations"); Gordon L. Poole et al., Financing of United
States-Flag Vessels, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1171, 1266 (1982) ("The Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981 (ERTA) opened up significant financing opportunities by eliminating the burden-
some restraints which often made leasing complicated and undesirable. ERTA provides a
new simplified definition of 'true lease.' This definition permits, through lease transactions,
full transferability of investment tax credits and tax depreciation between taxpayers.").
106 Views on deregulation have always been relatively fluid. Since the onset of the finan-
cial crisis, even longtime advocates of deregulation have been publicly critical of its role in
precipitating the crisis. See supra note 2 (discussing criticism). In some cases, widespread
fears regarding the impact of deregulation have proven unfounded, such as those regarding
the safety of deregulated air travel. See Alfred E. Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation,
78 AM. ECON. REV. 316, 321 (1988) ("The last ten years have fully vindicated our expecta-
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process of resolving that confusion and provides a normative frame-
work for evaluating tax deregulation.
A. Tax Simplification and Tax Deregulation
Despite deregulation's extensive impact on the tax system, tax
deregulation has proceeded surreptitiously. Outside of Australia,
where responsive regulation strategies have been affirmatively
embraced by tax authorities, tax deregulation might seem to be more
theory than fact.10 7 In one sense, that blind spot is purely semantic.
Although tax simplification predated deregulation by several
decades,108 by the 1980s the concept of simplification had evolved to
encompass deregulatory reforms.
Simplification describes an objective reduction in the costs tax-
payers incur to understand, comply with, and arrange their affairs to
minimize their tax obligations. 10 9 Deregulation, by contrast, repre-
sents an effort to shift authority from public to private hands. Such a
shift may or may not produce lower costs. 110 Since taxpayers can often
improve their bottom lines by increasing their tax planning expendi-
tures, liberating taxpayers through deregulation may in fact generate
greater tax complexity."!
A classic definition of tax simplification thus focuses on reduc-
tions in three types of complexity. 112 The first is rule complexity,
which encompasses the costs associated with understanding relevant
tions that deregulation would bring lower fares... , an increased range of price-quality
options, and great improvements in efficiency ..., all this along with a 35 percent or so
decline in accident rates.").
107 Unlike their Australian counterparts, U.S. tax authorities have not explicitly
embraced responsive regulation strategies such as tax deregulation. See Sagit Leviner, A
New Era of Tax Enforcement: From 'Big Stick' to Responsive Regulation, 42 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 381, 385 (2009) (suggesting U.S. tax enforcement pursue responsive regulatory
strategies modeled on Australian approach, which advocates for "a dynamic and gradual
application of less to more severe sanctions and regulatory interventions," coupled with "a
deeper understanding of the motives, circumstances, and characteristics of taxpayers").
108 See HENRY C. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 28-30 (1950) (encouraging simplifi-
cation of income tax long before 1980s).
109 A more comprehensive definition of tax complexity would include the government
expenditures to explain, ensure, and monitor taxpayer compliance. See Tax Reform:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 42, 42-43 (2005) (statement
of Joel B. Slemrod, Professor of Economics and Director of the Office of Tax Policy
Research, University of Michigan) (discussing compliance costs).
110 In my prior work, I have argued that any deregulatory reform that would not pro-
duce an objective reduction in tax complexity should be rejected. See Dean, supra note 6,
at 408-11 (noting costs of such reform).
111 See id. at 420-21 (noting example of significant complexity that decreases overall tax
burden).
112 See BRADFORD, supra note 40, at 266-67 (distinguishing among three types of
complexity).
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tax rules. Next, transactional complexity describes the costs taxpayers
incur to structure their affairs to minimize their tax burdens. Finally,
compliance complexity captures expenses related to filing returns and
satisfying ongoing requirements. Each form of complexity also
imposes ancillary costs on tax authorities. 113 Today, the term tax sim-
plification is often misused to describe reforms that deregulate but do
not actually simplify the tax law. More precisely, changes that grant
taxpayers increased autonomy tend to be characterized as simplifica-
tion measures regardless of their cumulative impact on compliance,
rule, and transactional complexity.
The deregulatory check-the-box rules exemplify that pattern.
They were introduced expressly as a simplification measure 1 4 and still
tend to be seen as the product of a successful simplification effort. 115
In fact, while replacing the old four-factor test had a positive impact
on compliance complexity, elective entity classification had an inde-
terminate impact on rule complexity and a negative effect on transac-
tional complexity. 1 6 For example, in response to taxpayer confusion,
authorities felt compelled to issue regulatory guidance regarding the
characterization of elective classification changes not long after the
introduction of the check-the-box regulations. 117 Measured in terms of
the aggregate expenditures by taxpayers and tax authorities, the
113 See Slemrod, supra note 109, at 44 (calculating complexity of tax law by including
both public and private costs).
114 I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297, 298 ("[T]he purpose of this approach is to sim-
plify the rules in order to reduce the burdens of both taxpayers and the Service.").
115 See, e.g., Heather M. Field, Checking in on "Check-the-Box," 42 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
451, 464 (2009) (describing check-the-box regulations as "simplified elective entity classifi-
cation regime"); David R. Sicular, The New Look-Through Rule: W(h)ither Subpart F?,
115 TAX NoTEs 349, 366 (2007) ("[C]heck the box was a handy simplification over plan-
ning under the Kintner regulations.").
116 The recent effort by the Obama administration is the latest (failed) attempt to rein in
the complexity associated with those entity classification rules. Lee A. Sheppard, Check-
the-Box Repeal Likely To Be Enacted, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Jul. 8, 2009, 2009 TNT 128-1
("The Obama proposal would treat tax nothings as C corporations for all purposes of the
code, not just for subpart F. A first-tier foreign entity wholly owned by a U.S. person could
still be checked, as could a same-country affiliate with a single foreign owner."); Kim
Dixon, Obama Tones Down Global Company Tax Goals, Feb. 1, 2010, http://
www.reuters.com/article/idUSNO119192320100201 (discussing President Obama's
"scal[ing] back" of ambitious plan to "close loopholes global companies use when
accounting for taxes on profit earned overseas" due to lukewarm response from Congress,
including fellow Democrats).
117 Although taxpayers insisted that they "be allowed to choose which form to apply to
an elective conversion" in order "to produce the most favorable tax results," authorities
decided to allow "only one [transaction] form for each type of elective conversion." T.D.
8844, 1999-2 C.B. 661, 662.
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check-the-box rules arguably increased, rather than decreased, the tax
law's complexity. 118
While both simplification and deregulation call for easing bur-
dens that the tax law imposes on taxpayers, as shown in Figure 1, they
do so in different ways.119 Simplification principally targets the nontax
costs that tax rules impose on private actors and related costs borne
by tax authorities. 120 By enhancing taxpayer autonomy, deregulatory
tax reforms may reduce those costs. But, as the check-the-box rules
demonstrate, they may both please taxpayers and increase those
CoStS.12' As a result, deregulation and simplification efforts are not as
compatible as one might expect.
As shown in Figure 1, a rule change may fit into any one of four
quadrants. The check-the-box regulations, for example, would belong
in Quadrant II if they produced transactional complexity costs in
excess of the compliance complexity costs they eliminated.1 22 If the
reverse were true, they would belong in Quadrant I. The partnership
anti-abuse rule grants tax authorities broad discretion to "recast trans-
action[s]" when those transactions achieve results that are inconsistent
with the intent of the partnership tax laws.123 As a result, the partner-
ship anti-abuse rule, in contrast with the check-the-box rules, limits
taxpayers' structural autonomy 124 and would belong in either
Quadrant III or IV depending on its aggregate impact on tax
complexity.125
118 Dean, supra note 6, at 453-57.
119 Deregulation provides taxpayers with greater autonomy by easing restrictions on
taxpayer behavior. Simplification reduces the costs of tax planning and tax compliance,
though not necessarily actual tax liabilities.
120 See supra note 40 (explaining different kinds of complexity).
121 This would be true whenever tax deregulation allows taxpayers to derive benefits
worth more than one dollar at a cost of one dollar in increased expenditures.
122 The increased transactional complexity would be the result of increased tax planning.
The decreased rule complexity would largely result from the elimination of the unwieldy
four-factor test.
123 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1995).
124 See Abreu, supra note 20, at 58 (concluding that anti-abuse rule "denied [certain
taxpayers] the opportunity to exercise choice").
125 If the partnership anti-abuse rule produced greater rule complexity than it elimi-
nated in terms of transactional complexity, it would belong in Quadrant IV. If the opposite
were true, it would belong in Quadrant III. Andrea Monroe argues that the rule had no
impact on aggressive tax planning. See Andrea Monroe, What's in a Name: Can the
Partnership Anti-abuse Rule Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
401, 437 (2010) ("The Treasury had hoped that the final [rule] would discourage taxpayers
from entering into abusive partnership transactions, but the regulation had no such
impact."). Monroe also argues that "[t]he Service rarely raises [the rule], the courts rarely
apply it, and practitioners rarely consider it." Id. If she is correct, then it would have
increased rule complexity (albeit modestly) without affecting transactional complexity,
putting the partnership anti-abuse rule in Quadrant IV.
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Outside of the tax context, it may be logical to associate increased
private autonomy with decreased regulatory costs. As described in the
next Section, advocates of abandoning command-and-control environ-
mental regulation have traditionally made just such an argument:
Given greater flexibility, regulated industries will find better, cheaper
methods of achieving environmental objectives.126 When it comes to
tax, however, it is more difficult to draw conclusions about the rela-
tionship between taxpayer innovation and regulatory expenditures.
Simply put, that is because a dollar devoted to tax planning often gen-
erates more than a dollar in tax savings.
B. Developing a Normative Framework for Tax Deregulation
This Section offers a normative framework for evaluating tax der-
egulation, providing a means by which policymakers may identify the
unique benefits and costs of deregulatory tax reforms. It starts by
presenting-and rejecting-the two primary rationales for deregula-
tion: liberty and economic efficiency. Neither provides much insight
into the benefits or harms of tax deregulation. It then offers two alter-
native means of evaluating these reforms. The responsive regulation
literature highlights the beneficial characteristics of tax deregulation
while the fiscal arbitrage concept shows its potential for mischief.
126 See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (discussing deregulatory reforms in
environmental regulation).
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1. Liberty and Efficiency
Deregulation, often cast in terms of regulatory reform, has been
an important feature of the political landscape for more than a quarter
of a century.'2 7 Although it is difficult to draw clear conclusions
regarding the cumulative impact of years of deregulatory reforms,
128
the drive to liberate businesses from government red tape and sub-
stantively deficient rules has continued through successive Democratic
and Republican administrations. This broad-based consensus persists
despite differences of opinion regarding the scope of the transforma-
tion that deregulation implies 129 and the justification for those
changes. 130
For some, government control over private decision making is
objectionable as a matter of principle.' 31 A libertarian might find even
127 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1403 (1998) ("Every president from
Gerald Ford to Bill Clinton has devoted significant political capital to the cause of regula-
tory reform."). Even President Obama has emphasized the need to protect private enter-
prise from excessive government interference. See Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 105 (Feb. 24, 2009) ("History reminds us that at
every moment of economic upheaval and transformation ... Government didn't supplant
private enterprise; it catalyzed private enterprise. It created the conditions for thousands of
entrepreneurs and new businesses to adapt and to thrive.").
128 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14, at 7 ("Even the United States, after 8
years of an administration with a stronger ideological commitment to deregulation than
any in the history of the Western world.., has hardly shifted the balance away from state
regulation."); Richard A. Posner, The Effects of Deregulation on Competition: The
Experience of the United States, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S7, S8 (2000) ("In the United
States at least, there is no general movement toward reducing government intervention in
the lives of its citizens. . . . The deregulation movement has actually coincided with
increased regulation of health, safety, and the labor markets, which is why to speak of
'deregulation' in the large is misleading .... ").
129 When Posner refers to deregulation he means something very specific: "Deregulation
in the United States means the removal or reduction of comprehensive controls over par-
ticular industries." Posner, supra note 128, at 88. Others see deregulation as part of a much
broader trend away from a rigid command-and-control regulatory system:
The command-and-control regulatory model of the New Deal era sought to
control market rates, control entry into industries, and command the minimum
conditions and requirements of production and service.... Responding to the
increased complexity, diversity, and volatility of the new market, the Renew
Deal aims conversely to promote diversification, pluralization of solutions, and
increased competition.
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 379-80 (2004).
130 See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 127, at 1403 (noting that President Ford
thought deregulation would be anti-inflationary and that President Carter supported der-
egulation to counter stagflation, while later presidents intended deregulation to promote
productivity and economic growth).
131 Take, for example, the deregulation of the airline industry and its impact on con-
sumers. See infra note 145 (citing discussions of airline deregulation). A libertarian would
approve of that deregulatory effort in part because it freed private actors (the airlines)
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relatively subtle public control-such as Cass Sunstein and Richard
Thaler's "libertarian paternalism"-problematic. 132 More broadly,
autonomy concerns have long played a role in motivating the popular
anti-regulation movement. Individual liberty often looms large for
advocates of limited government and lower taxes.1 33 From this per-
spective, shifting authority from public to private hands becomes
desirable even if such changes impose significant efficiency costs on
society. 134
Over the last century, the pendulum swung widely on the ques-
tion of the compatibility of economic regulation with individual lib-
erty.135 In the tax context, the government has broad constitutional
authority to enact regulations that burden individual liberty. Modern
constitutional law theory sees only a tenuous connection between
fiscal policy and autonomy, allowing public actors considerably more
freedom in their funding decisions than they are granted in regulating
protected activities. 136 As a result, today even the most narrowly
targeted taxes can be designed in such a way as to pass constitutional
from public strictures, not because of its positive impact on consumer welfare. A welfarist,
by contrast, would care less about the impact of deregulation on the airlines themselves
than its impact on the airlines' customers.
132 See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. Ci-n. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (2003) (acknowledging that some libertarians
will object to even relatively noncoercive regulatory strategy labeled "libertarian pater-
nalism" as "government effort[ ] to influence choice in the name of welfare").
133 See, e.g., The Contract from America, supra note 33 (calling for lower taxes along
with greater individual liberty and limited government).
134 See, e.g., ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974) ("Our main
conclusions about the state are that a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of
protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that
any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things,
and is unjustified .... ).
135 In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court refused to allow
government regulation of labor contracts except to protect public health or morals. Since
the end of the Lochner era, it has been all but taken for granted that economic regulation
does not impermissibly encroach on an individual's liberty. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877-82 (1987) (discussing changing notions of
government as regulator).
136 See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1282 (2008)
("Constitutional law commonly allows the government to subsidize the exercise of certain
constitutional rights and not others.").
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muster.1 37 It is also uncontroversial for tax rules to burden the most
intimate of decisions. 138
While liberty is an end in itself for some, others view increased
autonomy through deregulation as a way to achieve greater efficiency.
Although contemporary legal scholars do not always label these
changes as deregulation, the shift from command-and-control regula-
tion toward more flexible regimes endeavors to increase efficiency by
providing more private autonomy. Environmental regulatory reforms
designed to increase economic efficiency, for instance, typically are
not referred to as environmental deregulation, though they exhibit
such characteristics. 139 Deregulatory environmental reforms often
take the form of market-based regulatory strategies that impose
"financial penalties . . . on harm-producing behavior" and create
"financial rewards" for "harm-reducing behavior.' 140 As compared to
the traditional "best available technology"'141 style of regulation, pro-
viding private actors with more latitude allows them to achieve envi-
137 Taxation has long been exempt from the scrutiny that other types of regulation must
survive. See Eduardo Mois6s Pefialver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182,
2198-2204 (2004) (describing longstanding exemption of tax rules from Fifth Amendment
limitations such as Takings and Due Process Clauses); Lawrence Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot
Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax Legislation Constitutional?, 44 TAX L. REV. 563,
625 (1989) (concluding that even when provision applies only to particular taxpayers, their
constitutional challenge to "an ad hoc tax provision . . . should probably fail"). For
example, the proposed tax on AIG bonuses was not generally considered to be constitu-
tionally problematic. See Conor Clarke, Laurence Tribe: Is Taxing AIG Legal?, A-iiLANTIC
(Mar. 17, 2009, 4:22 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/03/
lawrence-trib-is-taxing-aig-legal/15 90/ (citing Laurence Tribe's conclusion that "[i]t would
not be terribly difficult to structure a tax, even one that approached a rate of 100%, levied
on some or all of the bonuses already handed out (or to be handed out in the future) by
AIG and other recipients of federal bailout funds so that the tax would survive bill of
attainder clause challenge"); Richard A. Epstein, Is the Bonus Tax Unconstitutional?,
WALL S-r. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at All (reaching same conclusion).
138 Even when tax rules impose obstacles to our exercise of fundamental rights, that
interference is not considered unconstitutional. See, e.g., Richard L. Elbert, Love, God,
and Country: Religious Freedom and the Marriage Penalty Tax, 5 Si roro HAL], CONs-r. L.J.
1171, 1189-1201 (1995) (discussing failed attempts to challenge "marriage penalty tax" on
constitutional grounds).
139 It is not difficult to find exceptions to that pattern, but labeling private-autonomy-
enhancing environmental reforms as environmental deregulation is decidedly the excep-
tion. See supra note 5 (noting examples of "environmental deregulation").
140 Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Ciii.
L. REV. 1, 112 (1995). Cap-and-trade programs are a form of economic incentives that
allow businesses to "purchas[e] permission" to emit pollutants and to "trade their 'licenses'
with other people." Id. at 113.
141 Id. at 97. The authors note that in the environmental context, command-and-control
regulations "usually take the form of regulatory requirements of the 'best available tech-
nology' ('BAT') .... BAT strategies ... are a defining characteristic of regulation of the
air, the water, and conditions in the workplace." Id.
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ronmental objectives at lower overall cost. 142 Of course, flaws in the
design of those financial incentives (or shortsightedness on the part of
private actors) may produce behavior that is penny-wise and pound-
foolish.143
When savings from deregulation are passed along to consumers,
the public benefits not only by enjoying, in this instance, cleaner air
and water but also by paying relatively low prices for goods and ser-
vices. 44 Deregulation of industries like air travel has been credited
with providing precisely that result. 145 By creating space for innova-
tion and competition, deregulation allows the market's invisible hand
to narrow the gap between public and private objectives. The obvious
problem that arises when adapting this approach to the tax context is
that the primary public purpose of the tax rules is to increase private
costs, in the form of tax payments.146
It is tempting to think that deregulation could offer the same eco-
nomic efficiency benefits in the tax context as it does elsewhere.1 47
142 Id. at 112 ("Often it would be far better, on economic grounds, for government (a) to
create economic incentives to engage in socially desirable conduct, and (b) to permit the
market to decide how companies respond to those incentives.").
143 It is not difficult to imagine that the recent BP oil spill might be a result of just such a
dynamic. Environmental regulations might have, for example, provided incentives for pri-
vate actors to observe safe drilling practices rather than imposing specific requirements
that regulators had determined to be safe. Miscalculation or decisions made in the short-
term self-interest of managers (at the expense of the corporation) could cause those incen-
tives to misfire so that inadequate safety measures were put in place. See Ian Urbina, In
Report on Gulf Spill, BP Sheds Some Light and Casts Much Blame, N.Y. TIMEs, Sep. 9,
2010, at A14 (noting allegations that BP's cost-cutting efforts may have contributed to
explosion and resulting spill). Proving such a connection is no simple matter. See John M.
Broder, Investigator Finds No Evidence that BP Took Shortcuts To Save Money, N.Y.
TiMI s, Nov. 9, 2010, at A16 (reporting findings of presidential panel investigating spill that
"disputed the findings of other investigators, including plaintiffs' lawyers and members of
Congress, who have charged that BP and its main partners, Transocean and Halliburton,
had cut corners to speed completion of the well, which cost $1.5 million a day to drill").
144 Cf. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 127, at 1401 (noting savings from deregulating
natural monopolies).
145 See SrTFVN MOiRISON & CIFFORD WINSTON, Tin, ECONOMIc EFI'-'ei's oiF
AIRINi DEREGULATION 1-2 (1986) (arguing that airline deregulation "led to at least a $6
billion (in 1977 dollars) annual improvement in the welfare of travelers" and "at least a
$2.5 billion ... annual increase in industry profits"); Posner, supra note 128, at S17 (cred-
iting airline deregulation with "an enormous increase in the volume of air traffic coupled
with a substantial fall in real prices").
146 The traditional measure of systemic noncompliance is called the "tax gap," which
measures the difference between the revenues that the income tax should collect and the
amount that it in fact does collect. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and
Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 011o ST. L.J. 1453, 1455 (2003).
147 Tax law presents an area in which the government directly interferes with the
market's functioning by raising costs for producers, prices for consumers, or both. In a
perfect world, tax laws would have no effect on private behavior. Unfortunately, even
without the many tax preferences and tax penalties legislators intentionally create, taxes
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Unfortunately, the mechanisms through which taxpayer freedom
would promote economic efficiency are not obvious. Through envi-
ronmental deregulation, competitive forces encourage private actors
to develop innovative strategies to meet public objectives. Competi-
tion and innovation in taxation are more closely linked to compliance
failures, such as tax shelters, than with a more smoothly functioning
tax system. 148 Likewise, the notion that increased tax autonomy is
desirable in and of itself is simply not consistent with the broad lati-
tude we grant policymakers on fiscal questions, even when they impli-
cate important liberty interests. 149 As applied to business entity
taxpayers, autonomy becomes even more problematic given their
more limited constitutional protections.150 Contemporary tax policy
discourse may be permeated by an unexamined "everyday libertari-
anism,' 15 but Murphy and Nagel conclude that this impulse embodies
little more than "unreflective ideas that we have unqualified moral
entitlement" to be free of tax impediments to our economic
activity. 52 While there may not be "a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes," neither is there a right to structural or reporting tax
autonomy.1 53
2. Responsive Regulation
As detailed above, market liberalism-either for its own sake in
securing fundamental freedoms or in the service of a welfarist notion
of promoting efficiency-falters as a justification for tax deregulation.
Responsive regulation offers an alternative normative justification for
would distort private behavior. See Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of
Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 INTlERNATIONAL MONrTARY FUND
SrAI- PAPERS 172, 178 (1996) (citing "deadweight loss-the inefficiency caused by the
reallocation of activities by taxpayers who switch to nontaxed activities; the excess burden
of tax evasion-the risk borne by taxpayers who are evading; and avoidance costs-the
cost incurred by a taxpayer who searches for legal means to reduce tax liability" as costs of
imposing taxes). The resulting deadweight losses are no more desirable than those attribu-
table to inefficient environmental or financial regulation. In the abstract, allowing tax-
payers more autonomy in the way they meet their obligations could help to minimize the
distortions that tax burdens inevitably create.
148 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Tax Shelter Battle, in THE CRISIS IN TAX
ADMINISTRATION 9, 12 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) (describing "competi-
tive market" in tax shelter innovation and sales populated by tax shelter promoters, invest-
ment banks, and accounting firms).
149 See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
150 Of course, corporations receive the benefit of some constitutional protections. See
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) ("The Court has recognized that First
Amendment protection extends to corporations.").
151 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 33, at 34; see also id. at 34-36 (further developing this
concept).
152 Id. at 36.
153 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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deregulation, including tax deregulation, that is not framed merely in
market efficiency or liberty terms. Instead, it employs deregulation as
a mechanism to elicit compliance from regulated entities. While
reduced costs are "essential [to the] compliance generating dynamic"
of responsive regulation, 154 responsive regulation scholars recognize
that other concerns-like democracy and justice-may shape patterns
of taxpayer compliance. 155
In Responsive Regulation, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite argue
that "public policy can effectively delegate government regulation...
to the regulated firms themselves. '156 In doing so, "[g]overnment
should ... be attuned to the differing motivations of regulated actors"
so that "[t]he very behavior of an industry or firms therein . . .
channel[s] the regulatory strategy to greater or lesser degrees of gov-
ernment intervention. '157
In recent years responsive regulation has become the focus of an
increasing amount of tax scholarship. 158 Scholars argue that tax
authorities, just like those seeking to promote compliance with any
other regulatory framework, should "show fairness and reasonable-
ness to those ... willing to cooperate, and focus enforcement capacity
on those flagrantly ignoring their tax obligations. '159 Cooperative tax-
payers can be granted significant latitude to engage in "self-regula-
tion," while noncooperative behavior produces a "transfer of power
from the taxpayer to the tax office, and a concomitant loss of freedom
on the part of the taxpayer.' 160
Responsive regulation does not place any particular value on
autonomy as an end in itself. Instead, taxpayers' freedom from
command-and-control regulation serves as an opportunity to demon-
strate-and provides a reward for demonstrating-trustworthiness. 61
154 Braithwaite, supra note 20, at 5.
155 See generally Michael Wenzel, Tax Compliance and the Psychology of Justice:
Mapping the Field, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 13, at 41, 60 (discussing relation-
ship between tax compliance and taxpayer perceptions of tax regime's justice and fairness).
More broadly, responsive regulation suggests that generally "an authority that is legitimate
and that is engaging seriously with the democratic will of the people does not need coer-
cion ... to win compliance." Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation:
Introduction, 29 LAW & POL'Y 3, 4 (2007).
156 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14, at 4.
157 Id. at 4.
158 See, e.g., JoHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE 37-68 (2005)
(describing Australia's experience with responsive regulation in tax context); TAXING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 13 (presenting collection of scholarly essays on responsive
regulation).
159 Braithwaite, supra note 20, at 2.
160 Id. at 4.
161 Cf generally RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST (2006) (exploring significance of trust and
trustworthiness).
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Cooperative behavior earns greater autonomy, which, in turn, pro-
motes increased cooperation. Ideally, that iterative process evolves
into a self-reinforcing "compliance spiral" in which a light regulatory
touch produces increased compliance. 162
In addition, by granting cooperative taxpayers greater autonomy
in meeting their tax obligations, tax authorities are also able to focus
their enforcement resources elsewhere. Theoretically, the end result is
a higher level of compliance combined with a lighter regulatory
burden on the typical taxpayer. 163
Two recent proposals provide content, in the tax context, to the
responsive regulation premise of de-escalation in exchange for com-
pliance. John Braithwaite provides the first, which he describes as a
"compliance-tax-rate-spiral."1 64 He suggests that a tax authority might
establish five benchmarks of corporate tax compliance "set so that the
aggregate increase in revenue from increased tax and increased penal-
ties on non-compliers at each benchmark would be calibrated at the
cost of a 2 percent tax cut."'1 65 Although he concludes that for the time
being adopting such an approach would be "premature,"'' 66 it could
one day "forge a more meaningful business-community-government
partnership toward a decent tax system."'167
The second proposal offers a similarly "radical departure from
the traditional approach to tax administration," offering taxpayers
greater autonomy by allowing them to elect between two different
enforcement regimes.168 Alex Raskolnikov proposes introducing a
new option, which would allow taxpayers to avoid high penalties by
demonstrating their commitment to compliance. For example, tax-
payers could agree that "the government's position will be presumed
correct unless proven otherwise by clear and convincing evidence."'1 69
Those taxpayers unwilling to accept such conditions, identified by
Raskolnikov as "actors whose marginal compliance decisions depend
162 See infra Part III.B (discussing compliance spirals).
163 Alex Raskolnikov argues for just such a bifurcated enforcement regime on welfarist
grounds. See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice To Target Tax
Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 693 (2009) ("Targeted tax enforcement ... can
produce stronger deterrence and improved voluntary compliance at a lower social cost
164 John Braithwaite, Large Business and the Compliance Model, in TAXING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 13, at 188 (emphasis omitted). While reducing tax rates falls
outside the definition of tax deregulation as I have discussed it, rate reductions could also
provide the necessary incentive to taxpayers to induce compliance.
165 Id. at 188-89.
166 Id. at 188.
167 Id. at 189.
168 Raskolnikov, supra note 163, at 691.
169 Id.
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primarily on the expected tax penalty calculus," or "garners," will
remain subject to the current enforcement regime but will be subject
to substantially higher penalties. 170
For critics of responsive regulation, the feat of increasing compli-
ance by increasing private autonomy smacks of alchemy. Their suspi-
cion falls equally on policymakers (who may merely pretend to
provide greater autonomy to regulated entities) and on regulated enti-
ties (who may fool regulators into seeing compliance improvements
where there are none). 171 In some cases, the stakes of the debate can
be exceedingly high.172
3. Fiscal Arbitrage
Despite nearly a half century of effort, the goal of eliminating
differences in the treatment of direct spending and tax "spending"
(so-called "tax expenditures") remains stubbornly out of reach. 173 As
a result, policymakers have good reason to substitute tax benefits for
direct spending.' 74 Implicit in tax expenditure analysis is the presump-
170 Id. at 691-92 (proposing that government measures to deter tax avoidance be
targeted to address multiple taxpayer motivations for avoidance). In responsive regulation
terminology, those categories would correspond to the compliance postures of "commit-
ment" and "game playing." Valerie Braithwaite et al., Taxation Threat, Motivational
Postures, and Responsive Regulation, 29 LAW & POL'Y 137, 139 (2007).
171 See supra note 16 (discussing risk of feigned delegation and compliance). Responsive
regulation falls into a broader category labeled "new governance." See Cristie L. Ford,
New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. Bus.
L.J. 1, 27 (2008) (describing concept of new governance as "identif[ying] ongoing delibera-
tion as the most legitimate and most effective mechanism for making decisions in complex
organizational structures," with such deliberation "accomplished by decentralized, broadly
participatory stakeholder groups"). See generally David A. Super, Laboratories of
Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 541 (2008) (attributing failure of decades of antipoverty law in general to democratic
experimentalism, one facet of new governance).
172 Cf. id. at 541 (arguing that new governance contributed to tragic consequences of
Hurricane Katrina for New Orleans).
173 Stanley S. Surrey is credited with popularizing the tax expenditure concept, which
attempts to make tax benefits equivalent to direct spending for budget purposes. See gener-
ally STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES (1973). By highlighting the equivalence between direct spending and tax
expenditures, Surrey endeavored to prevent "[g]overnmental financial assistance pro-
grams" from being "grafted on to the structure of the income tax proper." Id. at 6. Of
course any such system of accounting is inherently limited in its capacity to create a full
and coherent picture of the fiscal landscape. Professors Murphy and Nagel refer to our
tendency to rely on readily available information such as budget and tax expenditure data
as a form of myopia. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 33, at 14 ("Myopia afflicts the con-
temporary legislative process in the United States in a simple and dramatic way, in the
form of tables that set out the distribution of tax burdens associated with various tax
reforms.").
174 See SURREY, supra note 173, at 6 ("[L]ess critical analysis is paid to these tax
expenditures than to almost any direct expenditure program one can mention. The tax
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tion that because tax expenditures can be simultaneously large and
hidden from public view, they can permit legislators to engage in fiscal
arbitrage. Fiscal arbitrage describes the exploitation of imperfections
in the political and legislative processes by disguising spending mea-
sures as tax provisions. The opportunities fiscal arbitrage creates for
subterfuge suggest that it should be treated with skepticism.175
Unfortunately, as generations of leading scholars have shown, the
tax system has long provided a potent means of camouflaging govern-
ment spending, distorting decision making by both politicians and
their constituents. 176 Tax expenditures can be large and familiar, as is
true of the home mortgage interest deduction, or they can be more
narrowly targeted. 177 Tax expenditures take the shape of deviations
from income as characterized by the popular and comprehensive (but
entirely theoretical) Haig-Simons definition.' 78
For example, because the best method rule promotes the Haig-
Simons ideal of the economically accurate measurement of income, it
would be difficult to characterize it as a tax expenditure. By contrast,
both safe harbor leasing and the divisive reorganization reform grant
taxpayers a special preference and represent a deviation from Haig-
Simons income. The policies embodied in safe harbor leasing rules-
principally promotion of capital investment-would almost certainly
expenditures tumble into the law without supporting studies, being propelled instead by
cliches, debating points, and scraps of data and tables that are passed off as serious evi-
dence."). Still, the tax expenditure concept has been subject to serious criticism since its
inception. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National
Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244, 261 (1969) (questioning coherence of tax expenditure con-
cept); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical Review,
54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1663 (1992) (doubting normative baseline-pure income tax-implicit
in tax expenditure analysis); Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal
Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 188 (2004) (questioning whether "a mere fiscal language
innovation either can or should categorically shape political outcomes").
175 Others are less certain that tax expenditures are systematically under-examined. See,
e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 YALE L.J. 955, 957 (2004) ("[T]he decision to implement a 'nontax' program through
the 'tax system' . . . is solely a matter of institutional design."); Edward A. Zelinsky, James
Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and
Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166 (1993) (arguing that by concentrating variety of
spending decisions into single rulemaking process, tax expenditures are more easily scruti-
nized than other expenditures).
176 See Shaviro, supra note 174, at 187 (arguing that analysis of tax expenditures has had
"little if any effect" on their persistence).
177 See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, l1TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, 33 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2010) (estimating
2011 cost of home mortgage interest deduction at $119.9 billion and cost of deduction for
overnight-travel expenses of national guard and reserve members at $100 million).
178 See Martin D. Ginsburg, Taxing the Components of Income: A U.S. Perspective, 86
GEO. L.J. 123, 127 (1997) ("[Haig-Simons defines] personal income as the market value of
rights exercised in consumption plus net increase in investment assets during the year.").
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have been more effective if pursued through direct spending. 179 The
divisive reorganization reforms present a more complex picture. It is
certainly possible to imagine a regime under which the expenses of a
predivision restructuring would be subsidized directly. That would
have the advantage of limiting the benefit of the reform to businesses
that actually have the option of restructuring (excluding those unable
to restructure for regulatory, contractual, or other reasons). Such an
arrangement would, of course, be a boon to legal advisors. More
importantly, however, it might require a nontax agency-one
unfamiliar with the policies and risks implicated by nonrecognition-
to answer the tax-driven question of who should be entitled to
reimbursement. 180
Fiscal arbitrage is a product of the practical limits of tax expendi-
ture analysis. 181 Although tax expenditure analysis demonstrates that
spending and tax rules are often interchangeable, it is hardly a Rosetta
Stone that translates every tax provision into its spending analogue.
Inevitably, the true fiscal impact of changes in the tax laws sometimes
goes unrecognized by the public. One consequence is that policy-
makers have opportunities to buy low (when the cost of a favorable
tax provision is unwittingly borne by the public) and sell high (because
the recipients of their largesse understand its value).
Relying on tax expenditures rather than direct spending thus
enables legislators to engage in three types of fiscal arbitrage-budg-
etary arbitrage, cognitive arbitrage, and procedural arbitrage. The
most basic problem, budgetary arbitrage, occurs where the definition
of a tax expenditure is underinclusive.182 If the tax-free treatment
granted to certain corporate reorganizations should be classified as a
tax expenditure but is not, government actors hoping to curry favor
with corporate interests could make those provisions more generous,
seemingly without any budgetary impact. In such circumstances,
policymakers have a clear incentive to substitute tax rules in place of
179 See Warren & Auerbach, supra note 52, at 1779 (concluding that using tax system,
and concept of leasing in particular, as means of delivering subsidy to struggling businesses
was misguided).
180 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 175, at 959 (employing institutional design
theory to conclude that it makes sense for tax specialists to focus on tax matters while
leaving other issues to different types of specialists). Asking a nontax agency to decide who
should qualify for the subsidy would be problematic, even if not as absurd as "bespectacled
revenue agents ... parachuting into the Hindu Kush wearing night goggles, camouflage,
and pocket protectors." Id. at 958.
181 See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 174, at 247 (observing that tax expenditure concept is
difficult to implement because of need for line drawing).
182 See id. at 250 (noting that "a consistent application" of tax expenditure concept
would include variety of traditionally excluded tax rules such as corporate reorganizations
and other nonrecognition provisions).
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spending provisions. The resulting off-budget expenditures subvert
the public's ability to monitor government spending, which encour-
ages excessive use of the tax system to achieve non-revenue goals. 183
In the current era of budget deficits, opportunities for surreptitious
outlays may become increasingly tempting and troublesome. 184
Even when the tax expenditure budget does fully capture the cost
of tax expenditures (eliminating the possibility of budgetary arbi-
trage), policymakers still have reason to engage in fiscal arbitrage,
favoring tax expenditures over direct expenditures. 185 Cognitive psy-
chologists have shown how superficial differences between substan-
tively identical fiscal alternatives can affect the way in which
individuals respond to them.1 86 Because they facilitate the exploita-
tion of cognitive biases, including through the careful use of fiscal lan-
guage, tax expenditures continue to distort the political process even
though a completely rational public would ignore purely formal dis-
tinctions among policy alternatives. Given the ubiquity of tax expendi-
ture analysis, this cognitive arbitrage may be the most important form
of fiscal arbitrage. 187
183 See SURREY, supra note 173, at 6 (describing tax expenditures as "a vast subsidy
apparatus that uses the mechanics of the income tax" but has "no basic relation to that
structure").
184 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW
ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE, PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR
2010 BUDGET 114 (2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fylO/pdf/
fylO-newera.pdf (projecting deficit of just under $7 trillion between 2010 and 2019).
185 When it works, the tax expenditure budget eliminates objective differences between
tax and spending. It does not, however, eliminate the differences in the way they are per-
ceived. The recent health care debate has underscored how important labels can be. See
Adam Nagourney & David M. Herszenhorn, Republicans Call Health Legislation a Tax
Increase, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at A22 ("Republican leaders hoping to derail Mr.
Obama's health care effort have seized on a new line of attack: that the proposed overhaul
is a vehicle for a barrage of hidden and not-so-hidden tax increases, and a violation of Mr.
Obama's pledge not to raise taxes on families earning less than $250,000 a year.").
186 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects-Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24
VA. TAX REV. 797, 799 (2005) ("For individuals succumbing to framing effects, labels
obscure the similarities between policies that are substantively and procedurally identical
but differently-named .... For these individuals, policies unacceptable when framed as
direct expenditures become supportable when labeled as tax subsidies, even though the
economic substance of the policies is the same.").
187 Zelinksy suggests that the power of cognitive arbitrage offers one reason for the odd
blend of persistence despite inefficacy that characterizes tax expenditure analysis. See id. at
798 ("While tax expenditure analysis has been enormously successful as a procedural pro-
gram, it has largely been unsuccessful in substantive terms, failing to curb legislatures' use
of tax systems for expenditure-type programs."); see also Shaviro, supra note 174, at 187
("Tax expenditure analysis is like a hardy plant with shallow roots that spreads widely,
resisting the occasional effort to extirpate it, while having little if any effect on the soils in
which it sprouts.").
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 86:387
TAX DEREGULATION
Legislators' desire to circumvent parliamentary rules and proce-
dures provides another potential motivation for fiscal arbitrage. 188
Recasting tax provisions as tax expenditures does not ensure that they
will be treated as spending provisions for all purposes, and this
inherent limitation of tax expenditure analysis undermines legislators'
capacity to govern their own behavior. For example, spending can be
presented as a tax expenditure to avoid parliamentary obstacles such
as the filibuster or to flout budget rules through the use of sunset pro-
visions. The increasing popularity of sunset provisions in tax legisla-
tion may be in part a symptom of legislators' efforts to skirt self-
imposed budget rules.189 As a result, procedural arbitrage may
represent as much of a threat to the parliamentary process as it does
to the political process.
Whatever the ideal balance between tax and direct expenditures
may be, fiscal arbitrage has the potential to disturb it. More impor-
tantly, by undermining formal and informal fiscal constraints, tax der-
egulation further darkens an already bleak budget landscape,
exacerbating a fiscal crisis that has raged for years. 190
The next Part applies the theoretical framework developed in this
Part to evaluate the deregulatory tax reforms introduced in Part I.
Ultimately, it concludes that, although different deregulatory tax
reforms may vary in their relative potential for utility and mischief,
tax deregulation is likely to be deleterious overall.
188 Rebecca Kysar provides an illuminating exploration of the challenges faced by con-
gressional efforts at self-regulation. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark
Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 521 (2009) ("Just as if Ulysses
had hidden tools to loosen his ties . . . Congress possesses the ability to interpret, to
enforce, and ultimately to undo its precommitment devices.").
189 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1018-19 (2011)
("These estimates [of the cost of budget legislation] ignore sunset provisions for spending
programs with current-year costs greater than $50 million, but do not for other programs.
For purposes of estimation in the tax-cutting context, the committees assume sunset provi-
sions take effect even though, for the most part, temporary tax cuts do not expire but
instead are routinely renewed." (footnote omitted)).
190 Deficits are not the only harm engendered by fiscal arbitrage. A litany of ills has
been attributed to tax expenditures (and by implication, fiscal arbitrage). For example,
differences in legislators' perceptions of substantively equivalent spending and tax provi-
sions have brought about a regressive system of tax expenditures. See Zelinsky, supra note
186, at 803 ("Legislators ... do not review tax subsidies with the same care they give to
direct budgetary outlays. No legislature ... would enact a direct spending program that
conveys its benefits in upside-down fashion, nor would a legislature vote for such a tax
subsidy if the subsidy's true nature were disclosed.").
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III
COMPLIANCE SPIRALS, FISCAL ARBITRAGE, AND
TAX DEREGULATION
Deregulatory tax reforms neither promote economic efficiency
nor vindicate important liberty interests, and it is unclear whether
they simplify tax law. Nevertheless, deregulatory reforms that
embrace the teachings of the responsive regulation literature may be
valuable. This Part compares and contrasts the three deregulatory
reforms presented in Part I to distinguish tax deregulation that pro-
motes responsive regulation through compliance spirals from tax der-
egulation that merely encourages fiscal arbitrage.
While tax deregulation will ordinarily do more harm than good,
by employing the framework developed in Part II to evaluate and
shape deregulatory tax reforms, policymakers could pursue norma-
tively superior deregulatory strategies. The remainder of this Part
operationalizes that insight by examining the three examples of der-
egulatory tax reforms described above. The notions of compliance spi-
rals and fiscal arbitrage together offer a robust method for identifying
those reforms most likely to deliver on tax deregulation's promise of
mutually beneficial cooperation between tax authorities and taxpayers
with minimal damage to the fisc.
A. Evaluating Tax Deregulation
Whether reform of a command-and-control rule to give taxpayers
greater authority over their own tax treatment is likely to generate a
desirable blend of public and private benefits depends in part on the
nature of the tax autonomy it provides. The three reforms presented
above suggest several possibilities. Deregulatory efforts that increase
structural autonomy may be more likely to become vehicles for fiscal
arbitrage than deregulation proposals aimed at increasing reporting
autonomy. Alternatively, reporting autonomy may offer tax authori-
ties more opportunity to evaluate a taxpayer's compliance posture. Or
it may be that tax deregulation implemented at the regulatory, rather
than the legislative, level is more likely to promote improved
compliance.191
Unfortunately, these observations do not indicate a causal rela-
tionship between the characteristics of a particular deregulatory provi-
191 The best method rule, an example of reporting deregulation, illustrates all three pat-
terns. It provides taxpayers with relatively modest benefits and provides tax authorities
with useful information. The best method rule was introduced by regulation, unlike safe
harbor leasing and the divisive reorganization reforms, both of which were introduced by
statute.
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sion and their effects. For example, both alternatives for offering
taxpayers greater autonomy in the divorce context (i.e., increasing
reporting or structural autonomy) have the same fiscal arbitrage
potential. 192 More importantly, such speculation fails to identify the
relationship between the costs and benefits of specific tax deregula-
tion proposals. 193 This Section offers a framework for analyzing the
relative benefits and harms of tax deregulation by viewing such pro-
posals through the lenses of responsive regulation and fiscal arbitrage.
1. Responsive Regulation: Promoting Taxpayer Compliance
In the responsive regulation framework, assessing a private
party's compliance posture is the essential precursor to choosing
between rewarding heightened cooperation or making more vigorous
use of sanctions. 194 Of the three deregulatory reforms considered
above, the best method rule provides the most credible means for tax
authorities to distinguish among taxpayers based on each taxpayer's
behavior. Neither of the other reforms provides authorities with a reli-
able tool for gauging affected taxpayers' compliance postures.
The best method rule provides precisely the sort of mechanism
that responsive regulation envisions. 195 In particular, the best method
192 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing tax autonomy implications
of marriage and divorce decisions).
193 Increased structural autonomy might facilitate a significant amount of fiscal arbi-
trage, but it might also increase compliance. Conversely, increasing reporting autonomy
may lead neither to fiscal arbitrage nor to increased compliance. It is not difficult to
imagine an administrative deregulatory reform that increases reporting autonomy, but
which provides private benefits without any public benefit. An example might be allowing
taxpayers to designate exchanges that satisfy the material difference standard of Treasury
Regulation section 1.1001-3 (1996), which governs when a modification counts as an
exchange for purposes of the realization requirement.
194 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14, at 4 ("[R]egulation should respond to
industry conduct .... The very behavior of an industry or the firms therein should channel
the regulatory strategy to greater or lesser degrees of government intrusion .... By cred-
ibly asserting a willingness to regulate more intrusively, responsive regulation can channel
marketplace transactions to less intrusive and less centralized forms of government inter-
vention."); Braithwaite, supra note 20, at 4 (describing structure of responsive regulation
regime as regulatory pyramid, under which most taxpayers can be encouraged to comply
without coercion, but more coercive options are available to induce compliance if neces-
sary); Raskolnikov, supra note 163, at 693 (arguing that enforcement based on taxpayer
choice improves tax administration and compliance); see also BRAITHWAITE, supra note
158, at 68-102 (providing example of Australian Compliance Model of responsive regula-
tion, under which taxpayers were allowed to self-assess; those who did not engage in eva-
sion or aggressive tax planning were rewarded with guaranteed procedural protections, and
much greater emphasis was placed on enforcement capability and legal penalties for
noncompliance).
195 See Margaret Milner Richardson, Richardson Outlines Progress in International Tax
Issues, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 15, 1994, 94 TNT 246-28 ("To avoid a... penalty... it is
the taxpayer's responsibility to do the work .... We are confident that giving taxpayers
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rule creates no opportunity for fiscal arbitrage and grants taxpayers
little more autonomy than is necessary to reveal their compliance pos-
ture. In this regulatory scheme, taxpayers gain the power to self-
regulate as tax authorities cede primary responsibility for assessing
taxpayers' compliance. 196 In exchange for that concession, tax authori-
ties receive two distinct benefits. First, taxpayers inclined toward
public-regarding behavior have an opportunity to demonstrate their
good faith by offering regulators a useful starting point in evaluating
their compliance. 197 Second, and no less important, by failing to follow
suit, noncomplying taxpayers reveal their unwillingness to cooperate
with authorities.198
By shifting enforcement resources away from the first group and
toward the second, regulators may be able to increase compliance
among both. For taxpayers demonstrating good faith, the carrot of a
less heavy-handed enforcement approach would generate goodwill
and encourage their inclination towards public-regarding behavior.
For uncooperative taxpayers, deploying the stick of aggressive
enforcement would overcome their reluctance to adhere to the arm's-
length standard.199 In effect, taxpayers are forced to identify them-
selves as what Raskolnikov labels gamers and non-gamers.200
Safe harbor leasing sits at the opposite end of the spectrum. Safe
harbor leasing does not promote self-regulation at all, at least in the
flexible pricing guidance, backed up with a reasonable documentation requirement and
appropriate penalty enforcement, is the right formula for attaining ... compliance."). It
would be interesting to evaluate the extent to which authorities capitalized on the
compliance-enhancing potential of the best method rule.
196 See Braithwaite, supra note 20, at 4 ("[I]f taxpayers are prepared to meet their obli-
gations with minimum interference by the tax office, they should be left alone to get on
with it."); see also supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing framework for
designing successful responsive regulation regime).
197 See id. at 5 ("Taxpayers have the opportunity to persuade the tax office at the same
time as the tax office is trying to persuade the taxpayer .... If the regulatee chooses a
cooperative response, the regulator cooperates.").
198 See id. ("If the regulatee's choice is uncooperative, the regulator moves to a higher
level of enforcement that imposes higher costs on the non-complier."). The best method
approach fits squarely within the responsive regulation premise of greater self-regulation
coupled with discretionary oversight. The direct linkage between the reporting require-
ment and the penalty provisions is consistent with the responsive regulation notion of
affording taxpayers an opportunity to demonstrate cooperation while presenting the possi-
bility of harsh sanctions for noncompliance.
199 See id. ("[Clostly enforcement resources are not wasted on those who are willing to
comply, but are reserved for the smaller proportion of the population not willing to coop-
erate with the authority ....").
200 See Raskolnikov, supra note 163, at 701 (distinguishing between gamers-"rational
taxpayers whose marginal compliance decisions are made primarily based on the expected
tax penalty calculation"-and all others).
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sense that responsive regulation uses that term.20 1 Taxpayers and tax
authorities have long been engaged in a cat-and-mouse game over
attempts to circumvent limits on the availability of tax benefits; safe
harbor leasing rules merely provided taxpayers with a sanctioned
route to their preferred destination. The result is more a capitulation
by tax authorities than the collaboration that is responsive regulation's
goal.20 2 Taxpayers gain new freedom to achieve a favorable tax result,
but because that result flows from a transaction between private par-
ties, tax authorities acquire no insight regarding taxpayers' compliance
posture.20 3
The divisive reorganization reform produces an outcome that is
similar but not identical to that of safe harbor leasing. It certainly does
not create a formal link between tax benefits and tax compliance in
the way that John Braithwaite proposes. 20 4 Nor does it elicit the type
of taxpayer-specific information that Raskolnikov's approach would
generate and that tax authorities could use in distinguishing compliant
from noncompliant taxpayers.20 5
201 In the responsive regulation pyramid, "self-regulation" is associated with the motiva-
tional posture of "commitment," which is a demonstrated initiative to comply with regula-
tions. Braithwaite, supra note 20, at 3. One could easily conclude that safe harbor leasing is
more indicative of "resistance" or even "disengagement," both of which "reflect a con-
scious holding back of cooperation." See id.
202 One argument made in favor of safe harbor leasing was that private counterparties
would serve a useful function by policing potential fraud on behalf of tax authorities. See
Henry V. Barry, Note, Safe Harbor Leases: The Costs of Tax Benefit Transfers, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1309, 1319-20 (1982) ("A second justification for the lease mechanism is that lessors
perform a fraud monitoring function that would otherwise fall on an already overburdened
IRS."). While lessors would certainly have no incentive to participate in fraud, there is no
reason to believe that they would root out any but the most egregious examples of fraud. If
it were indeed true that authorities lacked the ability to monitor such transactions them-
selves, aggressive planning-if not outright deception-would produce more benefits for
all parties at little risk.
203 A direct-spending or command-and-control tax alternative might have generated
more information. For example, filing requirements imposed on taxpayers wishing to claim
the hypothetical tax refund could have provided authorities with information regarding the
nature of the underlying investment. Recent experience with temporary provisions encour-
aging repatriation of foreign profits offers a mixed picture. Businesses claiming the benefits
of this provision were required to document their use of the proceeds to make investments
in the United States that would create or retain U.S. jobs. See I.R.S. Notice 2005-10, 2005-
10 I.R.B. 474, 476 (describing requirements for "domestic reinvestment plan"). In fact, not
all repatriations facilitated by the provision resulted in the creation or retention of jobs.
See Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of
Amnesty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 667, 717 (2007) (observing that in some instances tax
benefits financed job cuts rather than retention or creation).
204 See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
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Tax-free divisive reorganizations are a phenomenon specific to
relatively sophisticated corporate taxpayers.206 To the extent that such
taxpayers can be viewed as a coherent group, a tax preference
targeted toward that group could promote a collective compliance
spiral implicating affected taxpayers. At a time when even household
brands were embroiled in tax shelter controversies, one could argue
that this gesture played a role in easing tensions between taxpayers
and authorities. 20 7 Although this particular reform was not explicitly
conditioned on increased taxpayer compliance, it might be understood
that in the future, similarly targeted measures would be politically dif-
ficult without such a compliance improvement.
Regulators would, of course, be unable to limit the availability of
favorable treatment to specific cooperative taxpayers. So long as the
relevant group of taxpayers-here, sophisticated corporate taxpayers
that have complex organizational structures and engage in transac-
tions such as tax-free divisive reorganizations-is both limited and
clearly defined, that might not matter. That loose link between der-
egulation and compliance could create an informal compliance spiral.
When the deregulatory gesture is available to a broader group, as was
the case with safe harbor leasing, the likelihood that such a collective
compliance spiral will gain momentum becomes more remote.
206 Part of the motivation for the reform of the divisive reorganization rules was that
today these transactions frequently involve a relatively limited pool of sophisticated corpo-
rate taxpayers. See Schler, supra note 92, at 240 ("Today spinoffs are often done by large,
publicly traded corporations with complex corporate structures."). By contrast, while a safe
harbor lease required the lessor (the purchaser of the tax benefits) to be a corporation,
there was no comparable limitation on the lessee, the primary beneficiary of the safe
harbor lease. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, I.R.C. § 168 (Supp. V 1976) (repealed
1982).
207 It is not difficult to believe that the divisive reorganization reforms were intended
partly as a means of generating goodwill-and increased voluntary compliance-on the
part of taxpayers. See, e.g., Tax Code Complexity: New Hope for Fresh Solutions: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 107th Cong. 39-40 (2001) (statement of Richard M. Lipton,
Chair, Section on Taxation, American Bar Association) (suggesting that "simplification"
proposals, including look-through rule for corporate divisions, might have positive impact
on "willingness of the average taxpayer voluntarily to comply with his or her tax obliga-
tions"). A collective compliance spiral could be useful in counteracting enforcement chal-
lenges specific to a given group. For example, starting in the late 1990s, a wave of corporate
tax shelters strained relations between corporate taxpayers and tax authorities. Even
household names like Colgate became embroiled in hard-fought tax shelter litigation. See
David Cay Johnston, Corporations' Taxes Are Falling Even as Individuals' Burden Rises,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, at 1 (describing involvement of well-known corporate brands in
tax shelter controversies). These disputes pushed taxpayers and regulators toward the
adversarial peak of responsive regulation's pyramid. In the end, the targeted deregulatory
measure may well have helped defuse this conflict between corporate taxpayers and
authorities.
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2. Fiscal Arbitrage: Tax Deregulation's Downside
By helping to promote taxpayer compliance, providing increased
autonomy can simultaneously serve public and private interests.
Unfortunately, while a compliance spiral tends to behave like a hot-
house flower, fiscal arbitrage is a weed. Whenever a change in the tax
laws provides taxpayers with a benefit that is the economic equivalent
of a nontax benefit, fiscal arbitrage follows. Even when the tax expen-
diture budget eliminates budgetary arbitrage, procedural and cogni-
tive arbitrage will persist. Only when a tax provision has a unique
fiscal footprint (or, as with the best method rule, none at all) will there
be no possibility of arbitrage.
The divisive reorganization reform provided opportunities for
policymakers to engage in cognitive, procedural, and budgetary arbi-
trage. It is easy to see the effect of cognitive arbitrage in this measure.
Congressional enactment of an economically identical proposal to
create a direct subsidy for predivision restructuring transactions would
be hard to imagine.20 8 Procedural arbitrage exploited differences in
the parliamentary treatment of tax and spending legislation.20 9 Since
nonrecognition provisions are not classified as tax expenditures, the
reduced revenues that result from expanding access to tax-free corpo-
rate divisions would not have been reflected on a tax expenditure
budget.210 That combination of cognitive, procedural, and budgetary
arbitrage allowed policymakers to deliver a subsidy to corporate
208 See generally Zelinsky, supra note 186 (discussing tax expenditures in context of so-
called framing effects, which posit that manner in which choices are framed determines
how such choices are perceived, and empirically testing for such effects in tax expenditure
context). In the case of divisive reorganization reform, the contrast between making this
change as a tax measure rather than through direct spending was particularly stark, as
lawmakers described the provision as tax simplification rather than a tax break. See infra
note 220 (citing references to measure as simplification). Ironically, it may have been pos-
sible to deliver that direct subsidy at a lower fiscal cost. Some businesses-perhaps as a
result of nontransferable contract rights or licenses-would have been unable to reor-
ganize at all. For example, if one business were divided into two corporate shells in an
attempt to segregate risky aspects (say, chemical manufacturing) from non-risky activities
(research and development of chemicals), one or both of those corporations might fail to
meet the active trade or business test. The out-of-pocket cost of reorganization might not
have been as much of an obstacle as a reluctance to combine the two parts of the business
into a single corporate shell. In other words, the reform broadened access to tax-free cor-
porate division treatment more than a direct subsidy for the costs of a reorganization
would have.
209 See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (explaining procedural arbitrage).
210 An early critic of tax expenditure analysis complained that this type of omission was
arbitrary. See Bittker, supra note 174, at 250 (identifying corporate reorganizations' non-
recognition as tax expenditure even though early tax expenditure literature did not
acknowledge it as such).
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transactions that is almost impossible to imagine being delivered
directly.
Because safe harbor leasing did not enjoy the same special status
as nonrecognition provisions, it was classified as a tax expenditure. As
a result, its fiscal arbitrage potential was more limited. The 1982 tax
expenditure budget reflected a reduction in federal revenues by an
estimated $2.65 billion as a result of the existence of the safe harbor
leasing provisions.211 Of course, its classification as a tax expenditure
did not prevent either procedural or cognitive arbitrage. As a result, it
is not surprising that contemporary commentators suggested fiscal
arbitrage may have motivated the use of tax deregulation to imple-
ment this subsidy.2 12
In contrast, there simply is no direct-spending equivalent to dis-
pensing with a strict hierarchy of methods, so there is no opportunity
for fiscal arbitrage with the best method rule. Although it presumably
had some influence on the budget for which it was impossible to
account, it is not appropriate to think of that as budgetary arbi-
trage.213 Likewise, there can be no cognitive or procedural arbitrage
without more than one fiscal form. Even if we assume that the crea-
tion of the best method rule allowed legislators to deliver a tax benefit
to a favored constituency, it would not have been fiscal arbitrage.
211 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAX EXPENDITURES: BUDGET CONTROL OPTIONS AND
FIVE-YEAR BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1983-1987, at 8 (1982), available at
http:l/www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/59xx/doc5940/doc34-Entire.pdf [hereinafter TAX
EXPENDITURES]. Tax expenditures can vary greatly in size. See JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2009-2013, at 26-47 (Comm. Print 2010) (showing range of costs of tax
expenditures).
212 It was widely acknowledged that both direct spending and command-and-control tax
expenditure alternatives were rejected for political reasons. See Safe-Harbor Leasing's
Stormy Future, Bus. WK., Dec. 21, 1981, at 104, 104 (concluding that political considera-
tions played role in rejecting alternative approaches out of concern that they "would show
up on the federal budget as outlays rather than as reductions in revenues"); Sunley, supra
note 64, at 289 ("Many in the business community opposed a refundable credit since it
would give the appearance of backing losers; that is, giving tax subsidies to unprofitable
companies.").
213 Since the best method rule offers taxpayers reporting rather than structuring
autonomy, the economic benefit it provides to taxpayers is limited. No less important, tax-
payers generate contemporaneous reports justifying their choices, and authorities retain
the discretion to overrule those choices. A well-advised taxpayer may benefit from its
choice of methods, but even that choice remains subject to review by the authorities. By
contrast, a taxpayer engaged in a safe harbor lease transaction that meets the statutory
requirements is assured of the benefits specified by the statute. As a result, the best
method rule is a poor vehicle for the largesse that is essential to fiscal arbitrage.
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B. Micro- and Macro-Compliance Spirals
This Section weaves the distinctions drawn above into a simple
method for assessing the normative appeal of deregulatory tax
reforms. Compliance spirals operate both on a broad scale-where
they affect a large class of taxpayers-and on a small scale-where
they implicate only a few taxpayers. This difference in scale creates
different kinds of incentives. At one end of the spectrum are macro-
compliance spirals, which create a high risk of fiscal arbitrage and a
low likelihood of creating a compliance spiral. At the other, the micro-
compliance spiral presents the opposite, much more appealing, combi-
nation: a low risk of fiscal arbitrage and a high likelihood of an effec-
tive compliance spiral.
The relationship between the probability of success and the
nature of the compliance spiral in question is relatively
straightforward. If tax authorities have the capacity to observe the
behavior of particular taxpayers, they can readily adjust their enforce-
ment intensity to suit each taxpayer.2 14 At the same time, if a taxpayer
believes that changes in her behavior will directly influence the inten-
sity of the treatment she receives, she will be more responsive to the
prospect of more favorable treatment.2 15 That describes the operation
of a Raskolnikovian micro-compliance spiral.216  In a macro-
compliance spiral, another taxpayer's treatment depends not only on
his actions but on those of all the other taxpayers in a given class, so
that if they collectively demonstrate a cooperative attitude, they will
receive more favorable treatment. Thus, the link between the indi-
vidual taxpayer's behavior and the amount of scrutiny the taxpayer
receives will inevitably be much weaker. 217
214 See Raskolnikov, supra note 163, at 707 (arguing that causing taxpayers to reveal
their inclination towards cooperative or aggressive behavior would allow authorities "to
match enforcement strategies with taxpayer types").
215 If a taxpayer believes his behavior will elicit a direct response from a regulator, he
will factor in the likely punishment or rewards from that regulator when deciding how to
behave. See Braithwaite, supra note 164, at 198 (explaining that regulator who demon-
strates that she is "willing to escalate" intensity of her enforcement efforts in response to
particular taxpayer's level of cooperation "rarely actually finds it necessary to escalate"
with respect to that taxpayer).
216 Raskolnikov's "compliance regime" creates the potential for something like a micro-
compliance spiral, with a single taxpayer identifying herself as a "non-gamer" and thereby
voluntarily limiting her avoidance options (e.g., accepting more stringent standards for tax
preparers) and receiving preferred treatment from tax authorities (e.g., receiving reim-
bursement of costs when an audit is conducted). Raskolnikov, supra note 163, at 715-40
(describing features of compliance regime applicable to non-gainers).
217 The contingent nature of the connection between the deregulatory tax benefits and
increased compliance in a macro-compliance spiral also creates opportunities for policy-
makers to misrepresent the existence of such a link. Attributing a change in the behavior of
a class of taxpayers over a given period to a particular policy change would be difficult,
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The influence of the scale of the compliance spiral on fiscal arbi-
trage is more subtle. If tax authorities are to successfully communicate
with a relatively large group of taxpayers, the signal they use to invite
taxpayer cooperation would need to be both salient and relevant to as
many taxpayers in that class as possible. That would favor precisely
those deregulatory tax provisions most likely to create the gravest risk
of fiscal arbitrage. Policymakers will inevitably seek to maximize the
salience of deregulatory provisions for its beneficiaries while relying
on cognitive, procedural, and budgetary arbitrage to minimize its visi-
bility to their (non-beneficiary) constituents.
Returning to the three illustrative deregulatory provisions, the
contrast between micro- and macro-compliance spirals is striking. The
best method rule seeks to create micro-compliance spirals. Affected
taxpayers gain flexibility coupled with an obligation to produce con-
temporaneous documentation of their decision-making process that is
available for review by regulators. Tax authorities bolster their
capacity to distinguish between taxpayers inclined toward public-
regarding behavior and those not so inclined-the same capacity for
sorting that lies at the heart of Raskolnikov's proposal. 218 In some
cases, this may mean taxpayers are given enough rope to hang them-
selves while authorities patiently await the outcome. The other two
deregulatory reforms, by contrast, offer only the possibility of a
macro-compliance spiral, linking the collective compliance posture of
a class of taxpayers with the availability of tax benefits. For that
reason, the divisive reorganization provisions could not create a
robust connection between compliance and autonomy. 219 The result
certainly more difficult than observing the link between the treatment a specific taxpayer
receives and changes in that taxpayer's compliance posture. It is also true that taxpayers
could employ social norms to enforce compliance standards for themselves. See
Braithwaite, supra note 164, at 189 (suggesting that "changing business culture so that
business leaders disapproved of their business colleagues who did not comply with the law"
could help promote compliance spirals). As a class of affected taxpayers becomes broader
and more diverse, it becomes more difficult for each individual taxpayer to identify with
that group. As the taxpayer's identification with the group grows weaker or stronger, so
too does the power of the group norm to influence the taxpayer's behavior. See Marjorie
E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance, 8 FLA. TAX REv. 599, 613 (2007)
("Identification with the group plays a crucial role in norm formation and influence. The
more a person identifies with a group, the more likely s/he is to internalize its norms and
therefore cooperate, that is, follow them.").
218 See Raskolnikov, supra note 163, at 691-93 (describing alternative mechanism
allowing taxpayers to self-identify as either "gamers" or "non-gamers"). By focusing
enforcement resources on the latter group, authorities could simultaneously avoid alien-
ating otherwise cooperative taxpayers and coddling the less cooperative. See supra text
accompanying notes 161-62 (discussing incentives toward cooperation).
219 Although the reform may well have been helpful in persuading corporate taxpayers
that self-interest could be compatible with public-regarding behavior, evaluating its success
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seems uncomfortably like unlocking a liquor cabinet before leaving a
group of teenagers unsupervised. It might be possible to determine if
everyone has behaved themselves, but identifying a particular culprit
(or culprits) in the event of misbehavior would not be. At the same
time, given the stark asymmetry in the perception of this change on
the part of affected taxpayers and the public, the risk of fiscal arbi-
trage would be high. Undoubtedly, the sophisticated corporate tax-
payers eligible to capitalize on the divisive reorganization reforms
appreciated their significance. The broader public may have mistak-
enly assumed that it was a costless simplification measure.220
The safe harbor leasing rules present a similar result. The inclu-
sion of safe harbor leasing on the tax expenditure budget does elimi-
nate the possibility of budgetary arbitrage.221 Unfortunately, safe
harbor leasing implicates an even broader and more diverse pool of
taxpayers than the divisive reorganization reforms. As a result, the
likelihood of a successful compliance spiral is even lower. 222 Although
the tax expenditure budget worked precisely as Surrey would have
wanted, the cognitive arbitrage potential of safe harbor leasing
remained unaffected. Had a handful of transactions involving high-
profile companies not captured the public's attention, it is not difficult
would be difficult. As a result, determining whether further deregulation would represent
an appropriate perpetuation of a compliance spiral-as opposed to merely being an exer-
cise in fiscal arbitrage-would also be difficult.
220 Legislators presented the change as a "simplification" measure. See 151 CONG. REC.
14,734 (2005) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus) ("Mr. President, virtually everyone supports
tax simplification. But for some reason, it is awfully hard to accomplish. Today, I am
pleased to join my friend and colleague from Mississippi, Senator Lott, in introducing tax
legislation that is non-controversial and a clear tax simplification measure."). Since, like all
other nonrecognition measures, it was not classified as a tax expenditure and thus did not
appear as a line item on the tax expenditure budget, the public may have assumed it had no
impact on revenues.
221 By contrast with the divisive reorganization reforms-which had no tax expenditure
budget implications-safe harbor leasing represented a significant line item on the tax
expenditure budget. See TAx EXPENDITURES, supra note 211, at 8 (listing safe harbor
leasing on tax expenditure budget).
222 At a minimum, that macro-compliance spiral would include cash-strapped businesses
investing in significant amounts of capital equipment. To the extent that the economic ben-
efits of safe harbor leasing were captured by lessors, the group might properly be expanded
to include them as well. See Sunley, supra note 64, at 289 (citing Treasury Department
estimates that fifteen percent of benefits of safe harbor leasing transactions went to lessors
as indication of efficiency of safe harbor leasing in transferring tax benefits). Even if safe
harbor leasing represented a sufficient incentive to spur those taxpayers towards a more
cooperative compliance posture, isolating its effect on them would be difficult. Empirically
demonstrating the precise impact of the availability of safe harbor leasing on the collective
attitude of such a large group would be almost impossible. To reliably accomplish that, one
would have to control for all other potential influences. A relatively manageable example
would be the level of resources devoted to enforcement with respect to the relevant group
of taxpayers.
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to imagine that fiscal arbitrage would have sustained safe harbor
leasing even if it did nothing to promote increased cooperation
between taxpayers and tax authorities.223
CONCLUSION
Tax deregulation has established itself as an important feature of
the tax policy landscape. It has done so despite, or perhaps because of,
a failure to grapple with its normative significance. By deploying the
insights of a wide range of scholars, this Article crafts a robust tool for
evaluating deregulatory tax provisions. In most cases, the likelihood of
fiscal arbitrage will outweigh the prospects for a compliance spiral.
Deregulatory provisions that aim to produce micro-compliance spirals
offer the most promising risk/reward profiles, but even they may do
more harm than good.
223 See id. at 290 (attributing reduction in value of safe-harbor leasing transactions to
political uncertainty surrounding tax provisions). This analysis assumes that safe harbor
leasing was a suboptimal means of promoting capital investment. See Warren & Auerbach,
supra note 52, at 1779 (concluding that safe harbor leasing "has precluded consideration of
alternative, and perhaps significantly better, resolutions" to structural issues in tax system).
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